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Letter dated 4 May 2006 from the Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 751 (1992) concerning Somalia addressed to the President of the Security Council

On behalf of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 751 (1992) concerning Somalia, and in accordance with paragraph 3 (i) of Security Council resolution 1630 (2005), I have the honour to transmit herewith the report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia (see enclosure).

In this connection, the Committee would appreciate it if the present letter, together with its enclosure, were brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council and issued as a document of the Council.

(*Signed*) Nassir Abdulaziz **Al-Nasser**
Chairman
Security Council Committee established pursuant to
resolution 751 (1992) concerning Somalia

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Enclosure

Letter dated 5 April 2006 from the members of the Monitoring Group on Somalia addressed to the Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 751 (1992)

We have the honour to transmit herewith the report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia in accordance with paragraph 3 (i) of Security Council resolution 1630 (2005).

(*Signed*) Bruno **Schiemsky**
Coordinator
Monitoring Group on Somalia

(*Signed*) Melvin E. **Holt**, Jr.

(*Signed*) Harjit S. **Kelley**

(*Signed*) Joel **Salek**

Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia pursuant to Security Council resolution 1630 (2005)

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Abbreviations

APRCT	Alliance for Peace Restoration and Combat against Terror
BAM	Bakaraaha Arms Market
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
ICAO	International Civil Aviation Organization
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IMB	International Maritime Bureau
IMO	International Maritime Organization
MFV	Motor fishing vessel
MV	Merchant vessel
NVCG	National Volunteer Coast Guard
OLF	Oromo Liberation Front
ONLF	Ogaden National Liberation Front
RPG	Rocket-propelled grenade
TFG	Transitional Federal Government
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UN-Habitat	United Nations Human Settlements Programme
WFP	World Food Programme

Summary

It is the task of the Monitoring Group to observe and report information regarding arms embargo violations and related matters in the context of unfolding events in Somalia. To that end, the Monitoring Group has highlighted its findings for the current mandate period, noting the major factors and developments in the present summary and describing them more fully in the body of the report.

Arms embargo violations and the militarization of central and southern Somalia continue. Violations comprise a number of different types and forms, including arms and ammunition, military advice and training, military materiel and equipment, and financial support. Those involved in arms embargo violations consist of the three principal antagonists — the Transitional Federal Government (TFG), Mogadishu-based opposition groups and the militant Islamic fundamentalists — and other important actors, including the business elite, pirate groups and clans involved in feuds over natural resources and other issues.

The Monitoring Group considers the militant fundamentalists to be those Islamic fundamentalists who are contending for national political power in Somalia and who have demonstrated their willingness to do so through violent means. In Somalia, these militant fundamentalists have been generally referred to as Al Itihad Al Islaami or Al Itisaam. They, like TFG and the opposition groups in Mogadishu, have been obtaining, receiving and otherwise buying arms and other forms of military-related support in violation of the arms embargo on a sustained basis.

It is significant to note that since the end of the last mandate, the militant Islamic fundamentalists have conspicuously and loudly moved out from underneath the protective umbrella of the main opposition groups headquartered in Mogadishu. In doing so, they have actively and aggressively asserted their independence as the third force among the major antagonists. After effectively declaring their independence from the main opposition alliance, the militants, through the sharia courts, have engaged the militias of the key opposition leaders in a number of bloody military-style engagements in and around Mogadishu. The militants, like the other principal antagonists, are well armed, trained and provisioned. They have significantly added to the geographic areas in central and southern Somalia under their influence and control.

The three antagonists and the other important actors referred to above have obtained their arms and other forms and types of military support from three basic sources: a widening circle of States that clandestinely provide support to the antagonist of their choice; the arms supermarket in Mogadishu, the Bakaraaha Arms Market; and individuals and businesses. While States tend to be the main suppliers of the full range of military support, including finances, there are powerful individuals and businesses that also channel arms, military equipment and financial support to the antagonist of their choice.

The arms and other military support referred to above have sometimes been provided to an intended recipient as a contribution to be used to foster the interests of both the giver and the user; at other times, however, arms and military support items must be purchased.

The Monitoring Group, since its advent in 2004, has diligently conducted investigations with a view to exposing the financial networks and sources that permit the seemingly unending purchases of arms and other forms and types of military support in violation of the arms embargo. During its activities leading up to its previous report, published in October 2005 (see S/2005/625), the Monitoring Group uncovered the various revenue sources of local warlords in their independently administered local administrations: airport and seaport fees, international commercial charcoal sales, permits for foreign fishing operations, ransom from acts of piracy, road checkpoints and others. Revenues generated from these sources help to explain the capability of warlords to maintain their militias and continuously purchase arms.

In its ongoing pursuit to determine the financial sources behind the purchases of arms and other military support, the Monitoring Group has, during the current mandate, uncovered the existence of a number of large business cartels and associated businesses, headquartered in Mogadishu, with complex and sprawling business empires inside and outside of Somalia. Their business operations generate millions of dollars each year. They spend a portion of these dollars to maintain well-armed and well-equipped militias, including the buying of arms and other military support items. They also provide support to warlords and have direct relationships and connections with the militant fundamentalists; in some cases, they are themselves militants.

The business cartels, associated businesses and local administrations have created a very powerful cross-clan web of economic vested interests. Their combined economic, military and political strength is powerful enough to bring the process of establishing a new government in Somalia to a standstill, in an effort to maintain a status quo that ensures the preservation of those highly lucrative interests.

Certain members of the business elite, the opposition-based alliance, including dissident ministers of TFG and warlords of local administrations, and militant fundamentalists are regular, long-time members of a select group of arms embargo violators who have previously been identified by the Monitoring Group and the Panel of Experts before it (see S/2003/223, S/2003/1035, S/2004/604, S/2005/153 and S/2005/625). Some of these same individuals and parties are again identified in the present report.

I. Introduction

A. Mandate

1. In paragraph 3 of its resolution 1630 (2005) of 14 October 2005, the Security Council conferred the following mandate on the Monitoring Group on Somalia:

(a) To continue the tasks outlined in paragraphs 3 (a) to (c) of resolution 1587 (2005);

(b) To continue to investigate, in coordination with relevant international agencies, all activities, including in the financial, maritime and other sectors, that generate revenues used to commit arms embargo violations;

(c) To continue to investigate any means of transport, routes, seaports, airports and other facilities used in connection with arms embargo violations;

(d) To continue refining and updating information on the draft list of individuals and entities who violate the measures implemented by Member States in accordance with resolution 733 (1992), inside and outside Somalia, and their active supporters, for possible future measures by the Council, and to present such information to the Committee as and when the Committee deems appropriate;

(e) To continue making recommendations based on its investigations, on the previous reports of the Panel of Experts (see S/2003/223 and S/2003/1035) appointed pursuant to resolutions 1425 (2002) of 22 July 2002 and 1474 (2003) of 8 April 2003 and on the previous reports of the Monitoring Group (see S/2004/604 and S/2005/153) appointed pursuant to resolutions 1519 (2003) of 16 December 2003, 1558 (2004) of 17 August 2004 and 1587 (2005) of 15 March 2005;

(f) To work closely with the Committee on specific recommendations for additional measures to improve overall compliance with the arms embargo;

(g) To assist in identifying areas where the capacities of States in the region can be strengthened to facilitate the implementation of the arms embargo;

(h) To provide to the Council, through the Committee, a midterm briefing within 90 days from its establishment;

(i) To submit, for the Security Council's consideration, through the Committee, a final report covering all the tasks set out above, no later than 15 days prior to the termination of the Monitoring Group's mandate.

2. The Monitoring Group was based in Nairobi and comprised the following experts: Bruno Schiemsky (Belgium), arms expert and coordinator; Melvin E. Holt, Jr. (United States of America), arms expert; Harjit Kelley (Kenya), maritime expert; and Joel Salek (Colombia), finance expert.

3. The Monitoring Group travelled to France and areas of concern in Kenya, Oman and Yemen.

4. Throughout the period of its mandate, the Monitoring Group kept the Security Council and its Committee established pursuant to resolution 751 (1992) informed of its activities by submitting periodic progress reports through the United Nations Secretariat and by providing a midterm briefing to the Committee in February 2006.

5. The Monitoring Group received much-appreciated support and assistance from the United Nations Secretariat and other United Nations agencies, in New York and the region.

B. Methodology

6. The Monitoring Group interviewed government officials in the region, including members of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG), and, where relevant, representatives of diplomatic missions, civil society organizations and aid agencies. The Monitoring Group also contacted numerous key, knowledgeable individuals from Somali civil society, including members of the opposition.

7. The two reports of the Panel of Experts (see S/2003/223 and S/2003/1035) and the previous reports of the Monitoring Group (see S/2004/604, S/2005/153 and S/2005/625) were also taken into consideration during the investigations. The evidentiary standards and verification processes outlined in the Monitoring Group's first and second reports also apply to the present mandate.

II. Known arms embargo violations during the mandate period

Arms flows continue

8. Notwithstanding the political overtures for a rapprochement between TFG and the Mogadishu-based opposition, behind-the-scenes arms flows into Somalia continue at a steady pace. The flow of arms also contributes to the ongoing militarization of central and southern Somalia by TFG, opposition alliance forces headquartered in Mogadishu and the militant Islamic fundamentalists. Militarization by the three main antagonists in central and southern Somalia, and others, involves the receipt of arms shipments, military materiel, equipment, training and guidance, and assistance aimed at creating military-style organizations and structures, including command and control capabilities, and financial support. In addition to arms per se, these other forms of military materiel and financial support also constitute arms embargo violations.

Sources of arms, military materiel and finance

9. There are three fundamental sources that the principal actors and others use to obtain military-related support in violation of the arms embargo — the arms supermarket, the Bakaraaha Arms Market, clandestine support by States; and support from individuals and businesses, as described below.

A. Bakaraaha Arms Market, the opposition and the militant fundamentalists

10. As reported by the Monitoring Group in the past in great detail, large quantities of arms are provided through the Bakaraaha Arms Market (BAM) in Mogadishu, where they are purchased chiefly by the opposition alliance and militant fundamentalists. The arms experts of the Monitoring Group have gathered details concerning some large deliveries of arms to BAM and subsequent purchases (see

annex I).[1] Consistent with information previously reported by the Monitoring Group, it has also determined that a portion of the arms sold at BAM derive from arms-trading networks operating from the region.

11. BAM played a particularly notable and key role as one of the sources of arms supply to the Mogadishu-based opposition alliance during repeated bouts of fighting between it and the militant fundamentalists in January, February and March 2006; they fought each other in a series of bloody engagements in Mogadishu and Afgooye, north-west of Mogadishu. As a result of the fighting, the arms supermarket was virtually emptied of arms and ammunition, but not before prices skyrocketed: single rounds for a PKM machine gun sold for $5 each. As has been the case for so many years, the business of war was good for the arms traders at BAM.

B. State support for the key players

12. According to information obtained by the Monitoring Group, a widening circle of States are providing arms and military-related support to Somalia in violation of the arms embargo. The Monitoring Group has obtained information that suggests that contributions to the three principal antagonists — TFG, the Mogadishu-based opposition alliance and the militant fundamentalists — are either clandestinely transported directly from the State concerned to the intended recipient or transported by way of intermediary maritime or airline companies to the intended recipient in an effort to disguise their true source. The contributions include arms and ammunition and military equipment such as trucks, uniforms, military rations and medical supplies. Military training, advice and direction are also being provided by States. The details are as follows.

Djibouti

13. During December 2005, Djibouti supplied 3,000 military uniforms to TFG. Well-informed sources of the Monitoring Group advised it that the uniforms were delivered to the TFG military training camp at Kongo, in the greater Jowhar area.

14. In its reply to the Monitoring Group dated 21 March 2006, the Government of Djibouti confirmed the delivery of uniforms to TFG. However, the Government of Djibouti stated that the uniforms were intended for the police (see annex II).

Eritrea

15. In its report of 4 October 2005 (see S/2005/625), the Monitoring Group made reference to "another State in the region" as having committed arms embargo violations. The Monitoring Group did not identify the State by name because, at the time the report was prepared, the investigation had not been completed. The Monitoring Group now believes that it has obtained sufficient additional information to warrant naming the State as Eritrea. For the sake of presenting a more complete picture that suggests a pattern of activity involving arms embargo

[1] Due to document-processing deadlines, the transactions indicated in annex I are current only up to 3 April 2006. However, the Monitoring Group will continue to update information concerning BAM transactions and present additional information, if available, to the Committee.

violations, the Monitoring Group has below reproduced the relevant paragraphs from that report, followed by the new information.

> "36. The Monitoring Group has been informed that another State in the region [Eritrea] provided support to the opposition and ONLF in the form of arms. That State provided arms to opposition allies including Sheik Yusuf Indohaadde (Governor of Lower Shabelle), Sheik Hassan Dahir Aweys (an Al Itihad leader) and others for the purpose of countering support provided to TFG by Ethiopia.
>
> "37. Credible sources alleged that from approximately the beginning of February to the end of the second week of May 2005, that State supplied arms on approximately eight different occasions to Hassan Dahir Aweys and elements of ONLF that at the time were located in the Dhusamareeb area of the Galgaduud region. The arms were transported on aircraft that flew from the State in question to an airfield located in the Dhusamareeb area.
>
> "38. Hassan Dahir Aweys had travelled to that central Somalia location to establish sharia courts and to provide military training to his militia (Al Itihad) or set up military training programmes. While there he also met with representatives of OLF and ONLF. Some were militia leaders who arrived in Dhusamareeb by aircraft from the State in question in April 2005. Also, during the last week of April and the end of the second week of May 2005, approximately three flights transporting 270 trained and equipped ONLF militia arrived in Dhusamareeb from that State. Most of the shipments of arms provided during the first part of the period mentioned above were given to Hassan Dahir Aweys, with the smaller portion going to ONLF.
>
> "39. The Monitoring Group also received credible information that the same State provided another member of the opposition, Sheik Yusuf Indohaadde, with arms by transporting them to two locations in Middle Shabelle — by aircraft to Baledogle Airport, near Mogadishu, and by ship to the port of Marka. Both shipments arrived between 25 March and 10 April 2005. Included among the types of arms in the shipments were anti-aircraft guns and mines.
>
> "40. The Monitoring Group noted above that Sheik Indohaadde and other opposition leaders from Mogadishu had provided arms to Habsade, opposition leader in charge of Baidoa, for potential use against TFG forces in the fight for control of that city on 30 May 2005. Subsequent to the battle, the Monitoring Group obtained two metal ammunition containers and photographs of other ammunition containers that were alleged by Monitoring Group sources to have been provided by the State in question.
>
> "41. The Monitoring Group has further learned that an opposition leader and TFG dissident from Mogadishu travelled to that State during the middle of the mandate period to make arrangements with authorities there to obtain arms shipments. The State allegedly promised to give arms only to the opposition and in quantities that equalled what TFG President Yusuf received from other countries."

New information

16. Sheik Yusuf Indohaadde arrived in Asmara on or about 14 November 2005 from Saudi Arabia. Indohaadde went to Eritrea to obtain assurances that arms would

be supplied by the Eritrean authorities to the Al Itihad leadership in Mogadishu. Indohaadde returned to Somalia, arriving in Mogadishu on or about 21 November 2005.

17. Also, on or about 14 November 2005, officials from the Eritrean Foreign Office who were posing as businessmen arrived in Mogadishu. The team met with Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys. The same delegation also met with the spokesman of the members of the transitional federal institutions in Mogadishu, Colonel Omar Hashi Adan. Colonel Hashi briefed them on the situation in Somalia and thereafter appealed for intensive Eritrean support to match the continuous assistance given to the Jowhar group by the Ethiopians. The Eritrean officials told Colonel Hashi to make his request to the Eritrean representative in Mogadishu. The delegation also expressed a keen interest in supporting the militant fundamentalists for the purpose of using them as a platform to mobilize and support an anti-Ethiopia agenda, also directed at the Ethiopian opposition elements (insurgent groups).

18. The Eritrean envoy in Mogadishu is Elias Haile Talaze. As his ability to move freely about Mogadishu is limited, he operates through an informal local network of people, including a number of local assistants. The envoy's activities are dominated by dealings with dissident Ethiopian ethnic groups who are concentrated in Banaadir and the Lower Shabelle regions. Accordingly, he has been instrumental in developing good cooperation between the militants and the dissident ethnic groups.

19. During the current mandate period, the Government of Eritrea provided at least four separate consignments of arms, ammunition and military equipment to the militant fundamentalists in Somalia, as follows:

(a) Around 3 March 2006, an aircraft with registration number E-B69 transported the following arms, ammunition and military equipment directly from Asmara to Baledogle airport (Lower Shabelle region), Somalia:

(i) 200 boxes of Zu-23 ammunition (anti-aircraft);

(ii) 200 boxes of B-10 ammunition (anti-tank);

(iii) 200 boxes of DShK ammunition (anti-aircraft);

(iv) 200 boxes of Browning M2 .50 ammunition (heavy machine gun);

(v) Ammunition for ZP-39 (anti-aircraft);

(vi) 50 rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) launchers and boxes of ammunition (anti-tank);

(vii) 50 light anti-armour weapons;

(viii) 50 M-79 grenade launchers;

(ix) Communications equipment to be mounted on technicals.

The consignment was delivered by Elias Haile Talaze to the Sheikh Abdisalan Ali Ibrahim, a military commander of the militant fundamentalists.

(b) Around 5 March 2006, an aircraft arrived at Baledogle airport from Eritrea, containing the following arms, ammunition and military equipment for the militant fundamentalists.

(i) 1,000 AK-47 (short version);

(ii) 1,000 pairs of binoculars;

(iii) 1,000 remote-control bombs;

(iv) 1,000 anti-personnel mines;

(v) Ammunition for 120mm mortar;

(c) Around 7 March 2006, and again around 14 March 2006, a dhow arrived from Eritrea at the port of El Ma'an, north of Mogadishu. The vessels contained ammunition for the militant fundamentalists.

20. The Monitoring Group sent a letter to the Government of Eritrea on 27 March 2006 requesting its response concerning the arms shipments reported to have taken place around 3 and 5 March 2006. In reply to the Monitoring Group's letter, the Government of Eritrea denied responsibility for the shipments of arms and characterized the Monitoring Group's information as "outrageous" (see annex III).

21. Information concerning the arms shipments reported to have taken place around 7 and 14 March 2006 was not sent to the Government of Eritrea for a response, as the Monitoring Group received such information only after dispatch of its letter.

Ethiopia

22. The Government of Ethiopia has provided at least three separate consignments of arms to TFG in Somalia, as follows:

(a) On 6 January and 12 January 2006, a total of 10 trucks loaded with arms and ammunition and covered completely to avoid identification arrived in Jowhar from Ethiopia. The major portion of the cargo was handed over to Mohamed Dheere, warlord and head of Jowhar administration and offloaded to his storage facilities, with some of the arms having been transferred to the military training facility at Kongo. A smaller portion of the arms was forwarded to Bashir Rage in Mogadishu. The shipments consisted of a variety of small arms, spare parts for small arms and ammunition, as follows:

(i) Small arms: 2,000 AK-47, 100 PKM, 1,500 G3, 100 RPG launchers, 10 DShK, 10 SKU and landmines;

(ii) Spare parts for ZU-23 (tubes), PKM (tubes) and empty magazines and belts;

(iii) Ammunition for ZU-23, ZP-39, DShK, PKM, RPG-2, RPG-7, B-10, D-30 (artillery), SKU, 120mm mortar, anti-tank mines, AK-47 and G3 rifles;

(b) On 28 March 2006, 10 metric tons of arms including mortars, PKM machine guns, AK-47 assault rifles and RPG (anti-tank weapons) arrived in Jowhar from Ethiopia, by road transport, after passing through the town of Qura-Jooma on the Ethiopia/Somalia border. The consignment was offloaded to a storage facility belonging to Mohamed Dheere.

23. The Monitoring Group learned that on 2 April 2006 Mohamed Dheere arrived in Jowhar from Ethiopia on board an Ethiopian military plane. The Monitoring Group also learned that during his visit to Ethiopia he had asked the Ethiopian

Government for additional military support for the opposition alliance, also referred to as the Mogadishu-based opposition. On the basis of the request, Ethiopia gave Dheere assurances of its continued support. The Monitoring Group has outlined in its past reports details of Ethiopian military support for Mohamed Dheere.

24. The Monitoring Group sent a letter to the Government of Ethiopia notifying it of the above information and seeking its response. The Monitoring Group had not received a reply by the time of the submission of the present report.

Italy

25. The Monitoring Group obtained information that the two shipments of military materiel (dual-use items) detailed below originated from Italy. The Monitoring Group further learned that both of the shipments were delivered to TFG at Jowhar, north of Mogadishu, and were subsequently used by the militias of TFG at their training camp at Kongo, in the Jowhar area.

(a) Between approximately 12 and 16 October 2005, the maritime cargo vessel *MV Mariam Queen* (known locally as the *Abu-Maruyama*) offloaded more than 18 trucks and a number of large, long, sealed boxes at the port of El Ma'an, Somalia. The boxes were under heavy security when they arrived on shore. Since their arrival, a number of the trucks have been used, in part, for transport of militia members at the TFG military training facility at Kongo, and at least three of the trucks have been mounted with anti-aircraft guns;

(b) On or about 14 December 2005, an Antonov 12, registration number ER-ADK, landed at the airstrip at Jowhar. Offloaded from the aircraft were a number of boxes. Printed on the outside of the boxes were words in Italian referring to the Italian military. Contents of the boxes included tents that were, in part, destined for the TFG military training facility at Kongo. The Monitoring Group obtained additional information indicating that the aircraft was one of a number of aircraft that landed at Jowhar during the same time period, containing similar cargo.

26. The Monitoring Group sent a letter to the Government of Italy concerning the shipments detailed above and received a reply dated 6 March 2006. With regard to the shipment of October 2005, the Government of Italy denied any involvement, stating, "the Italian armed forces origin, if indeed confirmed, of the vehicles ... could only be explained by their having been purchased on the market, from stocks of materials deacquisitioned by our armed forces, and indirectly shipped to Somalia by a third party".

27. With regard to the shipment of 14 December 2005, the Government of Italy confirmed the existence of the shipment and that it had financed six flights. However, the shipment of equipment was not addressed to the militias of TFG (see annex IV).

Saudi Arabia

28. During December 2005 the Government of Saudi Arabia provided, among other dual-use equipment, a quantity of military uniforms to TFG in Somalia, specifically to Hussein M. Aideed, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Interior. The items were transported to Mogadishu via a cargo container on a maritime vessel through the United Arab Emirates.

29. The Government of Saudi Arabia replied to a letter from the Monitoring Group detailing that shipment in a letter dated 27 March 2006. It confirmed the shipment, but stated that the assistance in question consisted of medical equipment, medicines and "anti-gas protective clothing" (see annex V).

Yemen

30. The Government of Yemen has provided one consignment to TFG in Somalia. Around 26 January 2006, the *MV Mareb* arrived at the port of the Bossaso, Puntland, Somalia, from Hodeidah, Yemen, containing approximately 15 Toyota Land Cruiser pickup trucks, 2,000 military uniforms, 2,000 pairs of military boots, 2,000 pairs of military socks, 2,000 hats and 1,780 belts. On 8 February 2006, an Antonov 12, with registration number ER-AXL, using call sign TET 1116, transported at least four of the Toyota pickups from Galkayo to Baidoa, delivering them to the Speaker of the Somali Parliament, Sharif Hassan Sheikh Aden.

31. On 2 April 2006, the Government of Yemen, consistent with the spirit and substance of the cooperation established between it and the Monitoring Group, provided detailed information acknowledging that it had shipped those uniforms to TFG in Somalia. However, it denied that the uniforms were intended for the military, insisting that the clothing was for the police forces instead.

Recent developments

32. Clandestine third-country involvement in Somalia was active during the reporting period. The Monitoring Group was informed that during January and February 2006, and at other times not specified in the present section, financial support was being provided to help organize and structure a militia force created to counter the threat posed by the growing militant fundamentalist movement in central and southern Somalia. The new force has been referred to as the Alliance for Peace Restoration and Combat against Terror (APRCT).

33. As of February 2006, APRCT reportedly involved the militias of dissident TFG Ministers, such as the Minister for National Security, Mohamed Qanyare Afrah; the Minister of Commerce, Muse Sudi Yalahow; the Minister for Religion and Endowments, Omar Mohamed Mohamud; and the Minister for Disarmament and Militia Rehabilitation, Botan Issa Alin. Also reportedly included in APRCT were businessmen such as Bashir Raghe Shirar and Abdirashid Ilqeyte and militia commanders such as Abdi Nurre Siayd, Abdi Shuri Ali Hersi and Isse Osman Ali.

34. Moreover, approximately between 18 and 22 February 2006 and between 22 and 25 March 2006, APRCT and militant fundamentalists fought each other in a series of fierce engagements in Mogadishu and Afgooye, located north-west of Mogadishu.

35. The Monitoring Group did not specify third-country involvement because at the time of the writing of the present report it had not completed its investigation.

III. Finances: economic vested interests

A. Introduction

36. The Monitoring Group continues to investigate the financial aspects of arms embargo violations with a view to uncovering the sources, organizations and structures used to generate revenues that are, in turn, used to buy arms and military materiel and maintain militias. As a result of its financial investigations to date, the Monitoring Group has determined that there are fundamentally two discrete but interdependent economic systems at work in Somalia, which generate very sizeable amounts of revenue for certain warlords, businessmen and others. Taken together, these systems represent very powerful economic vested interests, accompanied by equally powerful armed militias that protect these interests and help to ensure their survival and longevity.

37. The economic vested interests are represented by (a) business cartels and other associated business entities that have elaborate and extensive monopolistic operations extending throughout Somalia, in particular the 10 regions that make up central and southern Somalia (Galgaduud region and south), and into certain foreign countries; and (b) local administrations that are typically headed by warlords, some of them ministers of TFG, who are the principal beneficiaries of revenues generated in their respective administrations. The concept of local administrations was introduced in the Monitoring Group's report to the Security Council dated 4 October 2005 (S/2005/625), which highlighted their role in generating revenues used by warlords to buy arms and support their respective militias.

B. Local administrations

38. It should be recalled that the Monitoring Group previously defined a local administration in terms of a geographic area under the control of a single Somali warlord and containing a revenue-generating structure. The warlord acts as the administrative head of the area, has a monopoly on force and exercises power through appointed deputies who supervise the collection of taxes and fees from a wide variety of sources. Today, in the absence of an established central Government, Somalia is a patchwork of great numbers of independently operating local administrations.

39. Furthermore, the Monitoring Group had noted that a local administration could evolve as a result of control of a geographic area being shared among various warlords, who exercise joint administrative control over that area and share revenues. The total revenues obtained by either form of local administration are quite considerable, sometimes millions of dollars.

40. In its 4 October 2005 report, the Monitoring Group identified numerous revenue streams that contributed to the coffers of certain local administrations — the Lower Juba region and the city of Kismaayo, the local administration of Middle Shabelle and the city of Jowhar, and the local administration of Lower Shabelle. Key revenue generators included international commercial sales of charcoal and sales of permits to foreign fishing fleets that operate in Somali coastal waters.

Revenues from airports and checkpoints

41. Also referred to in the previous report were revenues generated from taxes and fees levied at seaports, airports and road checkpoints, among others. During the mandate period, the Monitoring Group selected some local administrations in the greater Mogadishu area and south to Kismaayo and further investigated the large amounts of revenues accruing from certain airports and road checkpoints (for a detailed breakdown of the revenues from those sources, see annex VI). Below are some important highlights drawn from the information obtained in relation to gross revenues, which are, in part, being used to purchase arms and ammunition and pay militia forces.

Airports

42. The Monitoring Group gathered information related to four airports: Daynile, K-50, Baledogle and Kismaayo. In general, taxes and fees are levied by the local administration on aircraft landings, passengers and commodities. The most significant commodity brought to all four airports is khat,[2] which accounts for 30 to 50 per cent of the total income for each airport.

43. Daynile airport, located near Mogadishu, generates an estimated $1.5 million in revenues each year. At the time of writing, shares of those revenues are said to be split between the owner, Mohamed Qanyare Afrah, and other shareholders, Osman Ali Atto, Omar Finish and the Ifka Halane sharia court. The K-50 airport, which is about one hour by road south-west of Mogadishu, generates an estimated value of $1.4 million in revenue a year, which is reported to benefit Ahmed Duale Gelle (Heef).

44. The airport at Baledogle, also located south-west of Mogadishu, and the airport of Kismaayo, located in southern Somalia, near the city of Kismaayo, generate $300,000 each for their respective owners, the Eyn sub-clan/Habergedir and Barre Hirale/Juba Valley Alliance.

Checkpoints

45. Checkpoints are one of the most immediate sources of cash for warlords. They have been in existence in Somalia since the early 1990s, when the civil war erupted and warlords and clans started to seek sources of revenue to allow them to buy arms and ammunition and other supplies that would permit them to continue fighting. Before the collection of revenues from airports and seaports started, checkpoints were the fastest and probably the easiest way to collect regular and substantial amounts of money. They continue to provide hard currency on a daily basis, enabling warlords to have enough cash on hand to purchase arms, ammunition and khat supplies for the militias.

46. All public transport vehicles (buses, lorries) must pay a fee at the checkpoints. Warlords set the fee amounts in accordance with their financial needs. If a driver is reluctant to pay, militiamen will start to fire their guns indiscriminately.

47. Checkpoints are spread throughout Somalia, and particularly in central and southern Somalia. Information obtained by the Monitoring Group indicates, for

[2] Khat, also known as qat, gat, and mira, is a flowering plant native to tropical East Africa that contains chemical stimulants similar to amphetamines, but much weaker.

example, that there are approximately 32 checkpoints in the Bay region, compared with about 51 in the Mogadishu area alone. Checkpoints in the Medina district of Mogadishu, Darmoole (a road between Mogadishu and Balaad) and at Balaad (a town about 30 kilometres north of Mogadishu) provide Muse Sudi Yalahow, the dissident TFG Minister of Commerce and member of the Mogadishu-based opposition, with approximately $1.3 million a year. This amount is exceeded by the approximate $4.3 million that are collected annually by Osman Hassan Ali (Atto), dissident TFG Minister of Public Works and Housing, at Afgooye, a town located about 30 kilometres west of Mogadishu.

48. Mohamed Qanyare Afrah, dissident TFG Minister of National Security, is reported to be the beneficiary of revenues collected in the approximate amount of $600,000 a year from a checkpoint in the Bakahaara area in Mogadishu. The Waceysle sub-clan of Abgaal receives revenues from the checkpoint of Sinai, located at an intersection in Mogadishu, in the approximate amount of $360,000 a year.

C. Economic powerhouses: business cartels

49. By far the biggest revenue generators in central and southern Somalia are the huge business cartels[3] and associated businesses that are multi-million dollar enterprises. They are monopolies with business operations that spread throughout central and southern Somalia and cut across both clan lines and boundaries of local administrations.

50. The Monitoring Group has uncovered the existence of three powerful cartels that are headquartered in Mogadishu and have operations with sprawling business networks throughout central and southern Somalia and extending into certain foreign countries. The cartels operate mainly in central and southern Somalia in an area that covers 10 regions of the country, namely, Galgaduud, Hiraan, Middle Shabelle, Bay, Bakool, Gedo, Lower Shabelle, Lower Juba, Middle Juba and Banaadir. They provide services to and may have shares of seaport operations in Marka and Kismaayo. The three cartels also have foreign business operations that extend from Mombassa, Kenya, to Djibouti and Dubai, United Arab Emirates (see map 1). The cartels are involved to varying degrees — as owners, minority shareholders or subcontractors — in commercial activities, including both maritime and land transport. They also have a virtual monopoly in relation to securing contracts with various agencies of the United Nations and other international organizations that involve activities related to general trading — import and export, food distribution, warehousing services, fuel supply, construction, telecommunications and money remittance.

51. Each cartel is independent and is made up of about three main companies, for a total of nine companies. In some cases, the companies of a single cartel may have the same shareholders and managers, especially when they involve family members. All of the companies of the three cartels are interconnected with each other by virtue of contracting among themselves. They also rely on a network of associated

[3] A cartel is defined as a combination of independent business organizations formed to regulate the production, pricing and marketing of goods by the members or a consortium of independent organizations formed to limit competition by controlling the production and distribution of a product or service. This is done in the hope of gaining a monopoly.

business entities (dealing in money remittances, telecommunications and fuel supply) and subcontractors to carry out their operations.

52. A general example can be used to illustrate the relationships described above: if a company is awarded a contract by the United Nations to deliver food in a region of south central Somalia, it may still need to subcontract with other companies dealing in freight forwarding, customs, port clearance and associated financial services, despite the fact that the company has its own boats, trucks, warehouses and equipment.

53. As for the assets of the business cartels, investigations indicate that they independently account for hundreds of staff, more than 600 trucks (owned or leased) with approximately 25 metric tons of cargo capacity, 96,000 square metres of warehouse space (owned or leased) spread across the 10 regions mentioned above and undetermined numbers of boats (owned and chartered), some of them with a capacity of up to 14,000 metric tons, barges, tugboats, shore cranes, forklifts and other equipment, valued at millions of dollars.

Support for the cartels from associated businesses

54. The cartels also require the services of certain associated business entities to facilitate their business operations. The Monitoring Group has identified various telecommunications, money remittance and fuel supply businesses operating in Somalia that are headquartered in Mogadishu. These associated businesses are also huge revenue generators in their own right. For example, it is estimated that Somali money transfer companies remitted approximately $800 million to $1 billion in 2000. Information further suggests that at least 9 of the 14 largest remittance companies in Somalia are part of different economic consortiums having businesses in general trading, construction, transport and shipping.

55. Cartels routinely require the services of both a money remittance company and a telecommunications company to conduct funds transfers by the quickest and most cost-effective means available. Telecommunications companies in Somalia, especially Mogadishu, offer modern technology, including high frequency radios, mobile phones, faxes and e-mail, regularly relied on by money remittance businesses to expedite funds transfers at low cost.

56. Telecommunication enterprises in Somalia, which are among the most competitive in Eastern Africa, manage portfolios including land lines, mobile phones and Internet services that generate revenues also counted in the millions of dollars. According to the information obtained during the current mandate, it is highly likely that half of the six largest telecommunication companies in Somalia are also involved in transport, shipping and money remittance businesses.

57. The above-mentioned interdependent system of business cartels and associated businesses seeks to minimize costs while maximizing revenues. Thanks to this interrelatedness, the cartels are able to manage their operations by splitting up management jobs, borrowing money at lower rates of interest, sharing the costs of advertising on the Internet and other media and buying supplies in bulk (e.g., fuel) and therefore obtain larger cost discounts.

58. It is difficult to quantify the total gross revenues of the three business cartels and the associated businesses that support them, not only because of the size and extent of their business operations, but also due to the lack of easily obtained or

publicly available complete information. However, on the basis of its investigations to date, the Monitoring Group is of the view that the total gross revenues of one of the cartels easily surpasses the gross revenues of even the most economically powerful local administration. The Monitoring Group obtained information suggesting that for 2004, the three cartels earned revenues in the millions of dollars. In one case, the Monitoring Group has credible documentation that one company earned $40 million for 2004. The Monitoring Group has learned that company revenues are deposited primarily in bank accounts in Nairobi, Dubai, United Arab Emirates and Djibouti.

59. Regarding the incomes and revenues generated by the local administrations, cartels and associated businesses in Somalia, the Monitoring Group has several observations. The only regulations they abide by are self-imposed, and the only taxes and fees they pay are to each other, rather than to a central Government. When they spend money on local infrastructure — roads, buildings, airports, seaports, etc. — it is chiefly for the furtherance of their own interests, whether security-related or economic. By contrast, civil society must rely overwhelmingly on international aid organizations for day-to-day survival and community development activities. The vast and complex web of economic vested interests of the local administrations, business cartels and associated businesses represents huge financial gains for their owners, and therefore the intense urge to secure and maintain those interests is compelling and primary.


Map 1
Geographical scope of the 3 business cartels
Gulf of Aden
Djibouti
Somalia
Ethiopia
Kenya
Indian
Ocean
to Dubai, U.A.E.
To Mombasa, Kenya
Based on United Nations Map
Legend
Transport capacity
Subcontracting
Storage capacity
Warehouses
Discharge operations
Kilometers
Jan 2006

D. El Ma'an seaport: a joint venture

Perspective

60. Notwithstanding the lack of an effective central Government, and in spite of the insecurity caused by the pirate groups off the coast of Somalia, maritime trade is thriving. Cargo ships laden with all types of foodstuffs, clothing, hardware items, oils and lubricants, fuel, building materials and electronic goods, arrive regularly at Somali seaports. Somali businessmen have links with traders in South America, China, India, the Far East, the Middle East, Mediterranean countries and East and Southern African countries.

61. Major seaports in Somalia are Berbera, Bossaso, El Ma'an, Kismaayo and Marka. Berbera is operated by the Somaliland administration, while Bossaso is operated by the Puntland administration. Mogadishu, one of the more developed ports with alongside berths, has not been in use since 1995, due to infighting by rival factions trying to maintain or gain control of the port. Kismaayo and Marka are under the control of local administrations and are run as private port businesses from which a considerable amount of unregulated income is generated.

62. In the course of its investigation, the Monitoring Group obtained the following information outlining 2004 statistics for inbound cargo for the major Somali seaports: El Ma'an — 2 million metric tons; Berbera — 552,000 metric tons; Bossaso — 368,000 metric tons; and Kismaayo — more than 3,000 metric tons.

63. Businessmen intending to conduct business at a seaport operated by a local administration must establish a financial arrangement with the local administration in order to ensure the safety of an arriving ship and its cargo and crew. The arrangement must normally be made before the transport of cargo to a Somali port of call begins. An advance payment is required and includes safety fees that range upwards from $50,000 per ship. Other fees are required upon the arrival of a ship at the port and may include those for marine services, port charges, cargo handling and road transport and hiring of barges, tugs and stevedores. This financial arrangement is essential because commercial insurance companies are unwilling to underwrite the risks involved in maritime operations in Somali waters.

El Ma'an seaport

64. Unlike other seaports in Somalia that are administered by local administrations, the three business cartels referred to above jointly own, manage and operate the seaport of El Ma'an, located about 45 kilometres north of Mogadishu. Each of the cartels owns one third of the shares of the seaport. The cartels also own a combination of maritime and inland transport businesses and freight-forwarding, stevedoring, cargo-shipping, fuel supply, general trading and construction businesses. There are about 320 staff working at the seaport who are directly involved in offloading commodities. The port's physical assets consists of 6 tugboats, 340 other types of boats and 310 trucks with varying cargo capacities.

65. The revenues at the seaport are collected separately by the three business cartels: one cartel gathers revenues accrued from land transport business, the second is in charge of receiving income from the tugboat operation and the third receives the fees from anchorage rights and other fees and commissions. Additional revenues gained from stevedoring and other vessel activities at the port are pooled and

subsequently divided among the cartels. The total revenues of the El Ma'an seaport for 2005 are estimated at $15.8 million. Each month in 2005, an average of 33,000 metric tons of commodities was imported through El Ma'an seaport, for a total of 396,000 metric tons, at an average fee of $40 a metric ton.

66. On average, every month 30 ships dock at El Ma'an. Anchorage fees for a cargo capacity of 3,000 tons or more are $1,340, while for 3,000 tons or less, fees are $450. The cargo ships bring in a variety of commodities, including sugar, rice, flour, tea, coffee, pasta, cooking oil, vegetable oil, fuel and cement.

67. The Monitoring Group knows that of the foodstuff items, sugar imports for 2003 and 2004 totalled 153,000 metric tons and 94,000 metric tons, respectively. The totals for sugar are more than twice, and in some cases more than thrice, the amounts for other foodstuffs. For example, 59,000 metric tons of rice was imported in 2003 and 28,000 in 2004. As described in its report dated 11 August 2004 (see S/2004/604), sugar shipments entering Somalia were being smuggled into Kenya, with enormous financial returns for businessmen engaged in that activity. The Monitoring Group knows from its investigations that one businessman, who is a member of the business elite operating from Mogadishu, with links to one of the cartels at El Ma'an, earned sizeable revenue through his involvement in distributing illegal quantities of sugar to East African countries.

68. The Port of El Ma'an also handles out-bound cargo, such as commercial quantities of charcoal. During June and October 2005, 22,872 metric tons of charcoal passed through the port on its way to foreign markets. The Monitoring Group has obtained information that a significant portion of the revenues accrued from taxes levied on the export of charcoal revert to a businessman who has in past investigations been identified by the Monitoring Group as being involved in arms embargo violations.

E. Link to arms embargo violations by the business elite

69. Arms embargo violations by individual members of the business elite have been documented in past reports of both the Panel of Experts and the Monitoring Group. The Monitoring Group has also documented violations during the current mandate (see annex I for details).

70. The Monitoring Group knows from its work that the seaport of El Ma'an has been, and continues to be, a gateway for arms and military materiel entering Somalia. Certain key members associated with the cartels have regularly, almost routinely, committed arms embargo violations, either by being the recipients of arms or military materiel or by facilitating the movement and transport of those items to their intended recipient, be it TFG, the Mogadishu-based opposition alliance or the militant fundamentalists. If the arms shipments are not destined for its own militia forces but instead intended for other recipients, the business elite is simply conducting business.

IV. Coastal resources and piracy

A. Coastal resources

71. The coastal waters of Somalia are rich in natural resources, including one of the world's richest fishing grounds and potential commercial quantities of seabed resources such as hydrocarbons and minerals. Access to these natural resources is being sold off by Somali warlords and businesses, sometimes through the services of foreign commercial companies that act as agents and intermediaries for the acquisition of fishing permits and, more recently, exploitation rights for seabed resources. At the time of the writing of the present report, the Monitoring Group was pursuing viable investigative leads indicating that companies registered in one particular South-East Asian country were actively conducting deals involving seabed resources. Also, and by way of example, the Monitoring Group has learned that an Australian company has purchased 50.1 per cent of the sole and exclusive rights to all seabed minerals, oil exploration and related development in Puntland, including the Sanaag and Sool regions. All of these activities translate, ultimately, into additional revenues for warlords or businessmen, which the Monitoring Group knows are being used to sustain and maintain their respective positions of power through the purchase of arms and military materiel for militias.

72. The Monitoring Group is also following up on information that indicates that a particular business in the same South-East Asian country mentioned above is in a position to award commercial fishing permits for the entire Somali coast.

73. Various local administration leaders and warlords have long realized that commercial exploitation of Somalia's fisheries and the granting of permits to foreign fishing organizations and individuals are a lucrative income-generating activity. Some permits are typed out on the previous Government's letterhead, while others bear the personal seals of warlords. Some owners or operators of fishing vessels state that they negotiate the licences before coming to Somali waters, while others make their way to one of the Somali ports in the hope of making some sort of arrangement with the local warlord to be able to take commercial quantities of fish in the adjacent Somali waters.

74. The Monitoring Group is in possession of a commercial fishing permit issued by the "National Fishing Authority, Jubbaland State", located in southern Somalia, to a commercial fishing company, owner of the *MFV Feng Jong*, located in an East Asian country. The Monitoring Group has learned that the commercial fishing company paid $80,000 for the permit.

75. In general, the Monitoring Group has learned that fishing permits can cost as much as $150,000 per year, per boat. The Monitoring Group has no audited figures for the number of permits issued, but maritime experts with knowledge of foreign fishing activities in Somali waters conservatively estimate that in any one season over 500 fishing vessels may be encountered in the Somali exclusive economic zone. Permits are issued in complete disregard for any international regulations or long-term sustainability of the fisheries, resulting in indiscriminate fishing and severe long-term degradation of the Somali fishery.

B. Piracy

Evolution of piracy in Somalia

76. With ships being attacked as far as 400 miles from the Somalia coastline, and the numbers of hijackings and attempted hijackings rising sharply, the shipping world is reeling with concern. From the beginning of 2005 to the end of March 2006, there were 45 attempted hijackings and 19 successful hijackings off the Somali coast. As a result, the International Maritime Organization (IMO) and the International Maritime Bureau — a division of the International Chamber of Commerce whose main task is to monitor maritime crime and malpractice — have issued repeated warnings to the ships operating in these areas.

77. In the late 1980s, during the time of the Government of Siyad Barre, Somali pirates posed as law enforcement officers in order to board ships. They typically initiated the assault of a ship by using verbal commands and warnings. If necessary, they graduated to the use of automatic weapons and other armaments (firing warning shots) to intimidate the crew and gain physical access and control of a vessel.

78. Somali pirates during that period were not as sophisticated as the pirates operating along the Somali coast today. Pirates of that period can be more accurately and correctly described as armed sea robbers. Sea robbers are passengers or crew members of private vessels who commit armed robberies of commercial vessels in seaports and territorial waters — normally up to 12 miles off a coast. They operated along the length of the Somali coast in loosely organized, ad hoc groups, and lacked sophisticated communication procedures and equipment and methods of operation. They took possession of a vessel for their own narrow uses, stealing whatever money and cargo was on board, such as diesel fuel, lubricant oil, stores and provisions. They typically did not take the crews of vessels hostage or ask for ransom money.

79. During the early 1990s, there was also another type of pirate in Somali coastal waters, the self-described coast guard(s). They targeted vessels that were fishing illegally and vessels that were engaged in dumping toxic substances in the coastal waters.

80. With the continuing breakdown in Somalia of national law and order, as a result of the fall of the Siyad Barre Government and its institutions, fisheries enforcement was left to regional authorities using armed local militias to protect what they considered to be their property; in some cases, this involved seizing vessels deemed to be a threat to their respective self-defined interests. However, this type of enforcement action was insufficient to deter foreign fishing trawlers in search of lucrative commercial fishing grounds from moving closer to the Somali coast. As a result, direct confrontation was triggered between the foreign fishing vessels and Somali traditional inshore fishermen, causing local communities to become more aggressive towards the foreign vessels, eventually ending in armed Somalis chasing them with speedboats.

Organizations and operations

81. This type of grass-roots enforcement by the coast guards, coupled with the activity of the armed sea robbers, evolved into the much more sophisticated and

lucrative money-making activity of today that is aptly referred to as piracy: an international crime committed in international waters — beyond the 12-mile territorial limit of a State — by crews or passengers of a private vessel for private gain and directed at another private vessel, typically accompanied by illegal acts of violence, detention or depredation.

82. The information presented on piracy in the present section is indicative, at best, of the current type of Somali pirate organizations and operations in existence in Somali waters at the time of the writing of the present report. The information is far from complete; however, the Monitoring Group continues its investigation. During the current mandate, the Monitoring Group interviewed, among numerous other knowledgeable sources, the crews of pirated vessels — the *MV Semlow* (a Kenyan-owned cargo ship), the *MV Safina Al Bisarat* (an Indian-registered trading dhow) and the *MFV Feng Jong*. The resulting composite of information suggests a profile of current Somali pirate organizations and operating techniques.

83. Somali pirates have land-based headquarters that provide planning, command, control and coordination of vessel seizures. The Monitoring Group has also been informed that the pirates have their own intelligence or information-gathering networks, elements of which are located in other countries in the region. Individuals in the networks inform the pirate headquarters of details of vessels operating off the Somali coast.

84. The pirate leadership ensures that pirate assault crews are properly trained, equipped and directed. Pirate assault crew operations include the following characteristics: the crews have communications, navigation and seamanship skills for the marine environment; about 10 pirates participate in the attack on a target vessel and use three boats during the attack — two speedboats and a provisions boat; the pirates who board the target vessels using boarding ladders are typically armed with pistols, AK-47 assault rifles and RPGs; immediately following the boarding of the target vessel, they secure the vessel and take over the ship's command centre, the bridge. Using the ship's radio equipment or a satellite telephone they contact their land-based headquarters for further instructions. The pirates control the crew of the vessel by intimidation and threats of physical violence and do not permit the crew to maintain the ship's log. Once in control of the seized vessel, the pirates may use it as an ad hoc mother ship to target and attack other ships that present an opportunity.

85. A pirate assault crew will attack any ship without regard for its flag State, the nationality of the crew or the cargo it carries. Being aware of the limited range and seakeeping qualities of their inshore speedboats, Somali pirates have resorted to capturing fishing trawlers and dhows for use as mother ships for their ventures up to 400 miles from the shore. Once they have commandeered a vessel, the pirates direct the captain to head for busy sea lanes and, using the captured vessel's radar, they are able to monitor ship movements up to 60 miles away. They then lie in wait for an unsuspecting merchant ship to appear above the horizon, at which time they launch their attack in speedboats, RPGs, assault rifles and flares, as necessary. Not all attempted hijackings are successful, and not all attempts are reported by victim ships.

86. Having seized a ship, a pirate assault crew typically detains the vessel and demands ransom payments. The pirates are not interested primarily in the value of

the ship or the cargo, per se; their chief intent is to extort money from the owners or operators of the international ship.

87. These groups have complex, secretive international networks that facilitate negotiations and movements of ransom monies. The pirate groups use their connections located in other States of the region to facilitate ransom transactions or transfers of money. Clandestine financial services and arrangements provided through their connections help pirate organizations channel ransom payments from the ship owners to the warlords in charge of the pirate groups.

88. Recent ransom transactions have shown that pirates have asked for ransom to be paid in cash, typically United States currency in the form of used $50 bills. In one case the pirates specified that they did not want to be paid with packages of serialized new currency. The Monitoring Group has been informed that, to date, at least $2 million cash in ransom money has been paid to Somali pirates by owners and operators of hijacked vessels.

89. Monies obtained through ransom are used to purchase arms. The Monitoring Group continues to investigate the relationship between piracy, ransom paid and the purchase of arms and the maintenance of strong and capable militias by pirate groups.

Pirate groups

90. There are at least four pirate groups operating in Somali waters, as follows:

(a) *National Volunteer Coast Guard (NVCG).* This group focuses on intercepting small boats and fishing vessels; it operates close to shore in the greater area of Kismaayo, along the southern coast of Somalia. Its leader/commander is Mohamed Garaad;

(b) *The Marka groups.* These consist of several scattered and less well-organized small groups, operating out of the greater Marka area of Lower Shabelle. They generally have fishing boats and fleets with longer operating ranges than NVCG. Their boats, in some cases, have guns mounted on the decks. These groups intercept a variety of types of vessels. They participate in sea robbery, smuggling and piracy activities and are financed by Sheik Yusuf Indohaadde, warlord and Governor of Lower Shabelle;

(c) *The Somali Marines.* Organizationally and operationally, these are the most sophisticated of all Somali pirate groups. They are organized along military lines, with a Fleet Admiral (Mohamed Ali Hassan), Admiral (Mohamed Osman), Vice Admiral (General "Gray", head of marine operations) and head of financial operations (Afweyne). They appear to have the capability to operate at a greater distance offshore than the other pirate groups and participate in acts of piracy involving vessel seizure, kidnapping and ransom demands. They operate in areas in the central Somalia coastal region, including off of Haradheere, their main base area, and Ely, a satellite location north of Haradheere;

(d) *The Puntland groups.* These may be Somalia's traditional or original fishermen pirates or armed sea robbers, representing some of the longer-existing pirate groups. They are experienced, older men who conduct their pirate activities in a low-key manner and are located in four geographic areas: south-east of Socotra Island; Ras Asir, off north-east Somalia; Alula Cape, off northern Somalia; and

Bareda Village, 150 kilometres east of Bossaso, Puntland. It has been reported that these traditional Somali pirates provide training to the Somali Marines. They participate in smuggling and acts of piracy and use modified fishing vessels to carry out attacks on vessels.

C. Link to arms embargo violations

91. The Monitoring Group has learned that ransom monies obtained from acts of piracy are being used, in part, for personal profit and to buy arms. In the case of the Somali Marines, for example, who are of the Saleeban sub-clan (Hawiye clan), they purchase arms for use by their pirate assault crews and to strengthen their militias. Their militias are being used to fight the militias of the Sa'ad sub-clan (also Hawiye clan), both located in the Mudug region, in central Somalia. They are fighting over control of access to water.

92. The Monitoring Group continues its investigation with the purpose of better understanding Somali pirate organization and operations, including the use of ransom monies to purchase arms and maintain militias.

D. Case study: an act of piracy by the Somali Marines -- the dhow *Safina Al Bisarat*

93. The *Safina Al Bisarat*, an Indian-owned and -registered dhow, has been operating between India, the Middle East and Somalia for the past six years, carrying various types of goods between various ports.

94. On its most recent voyage to Somalia, during January 2006, the *Al Bisarat*, having offloaded goods at the port of El Ma'an, proceeded south along the Somali coast to the port of Kismaayo, where it took on board a commercial load of 18,000 25-kilogram bags of charcoal. The *Al Bisarat* departed Kismaayo for Ajman, Dubai, United Arab Emirates, on 14 January, proceeding north-east along the Somali coast.

95. After two days of travel, on 16 January the vessel was about 200 miles north-east of Kismaayo, when it was suddenly and quickly attacked by three small speedboats carrying 10 men brandishing weapons. The men were pirates from the Somali Marines; they were armed with AK-47 assault rifles, RPG launchers and pistols. Pulling alongside the *Al Bisarat* and using ladders, the pirates quickly boarded the vessel. Once on board, the pirates conducted a security sweep and brought the captain and the 15-member crew under control. The captives were then threatened with physical violence unless they followed the pirates' orders.

96. After taking control of the vessel and the entire crew, the pirates went to the bridge, where the ship's radio is kept. The leader of the pirates made radio contact with his headquarters, notifying the leadership that the assault crew had taken control of the ship and asking for further instructions. A few of the pirates then stationed themselves at various strategic positions around the dhow, with the head of the pirate assault crew taking over the bridge and radio. The three speedboats used by the pirates for the assault were attached to the hijacked vessel for towing, and three of the pirates remained with one of the boats, which contained a cache of weapons, fuel and other provisions.

97. Following the pirates' radio contact with their leadership, the captain of the *Al Bisarat* was ordered to change his ship's direction of travel and move not towards land, but out to sea, to the busy shipping lanes. At that point, the intent of the pirates seemed clear enough: the *Al Bisarat* would be used as a mother ship, a platform that the pirates would use to approach other unsuspecting vessels and then suddenly launch their attack. From the moment the pirates had initiated their surprise attack on the *Al Bisarat*, to the takeover and control of the ship, the use of the radio to contact their headquarters and the giving of instructions to move the *Al Bisarat* to the shipping lanes, the Somali Marines demonstrated an effective level of competence and knowledge of dhow operations and the maritime environment in which they operated.

98. For the next three days, using the *Al Bisarat* as cover, the pirates plied the shipping lanes, hunting for their next victim. Opportunities presented themselves on each of the three days: on 17 and 18 January, the pirates tried to hijack an unidentified container ship and a tanker, respectively, by giving chase with their speedboats and simultaneously shooting at them. Their actions were intended to intimidate and to cause the ships to stop and surrender to the pirates; but in neither case did the tactic work, and the vessels escaped capture. However, one of the ships had received a direct hit from an RPG fired by a pirate — smoke was visible in the area of the bridge. The damage sustained, in terms of both ship structure and human casualties, is unknown by the Monitoring Group. Neither of the vessels has filed a public report of the attempted hijackings.

99. On 19 January, the pirates attempted another hijacking about 300 kilometres off the Somali coast. This, too, was unsuccessful. In this instance, the name of the vessel is known: the Bahamas-registered bulk carrier *MV Delta Ranger*. Little did the pirates know that this attack would trigger a chain of events that would make it their last. The *MV Delta Ranger* reported the attack to the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) at Kuala Lumpur. The hunters had now become the hunted.

100. The IMB report of the attempted hijacking was received by United States naval forces that were operating in the open ocean far off the Somali coast. Using information from the report, the naval forces were able to locate the suspected mother ship of the pirates. The United States Navy then initiated a discreet surveillance of the *Al Bisarat*.

101. After dusk on the moonless night of 20 January, the *Al Bisarat* was followed at close range by helicopter. Upon hearing the noise of the helicopter engine, the pirates panicked. They immediately ordered the ship's captain to change course and head towards the Somali coast, hoping to seek the safety of Somali territorial waters.

102. United States naval forces followed the *Al Bisarat*, continuing their surveillance at a distance. At about 0800 hours on 21 January, a United States naval ship, the *USS Winston S. Churchill*, made unsuccessful attempts to establish ship-to-ship radio contact with the *Al Bisarat*. The pirates ordered the ship's captain not to respond to the radio communications and further ordered him to maintain course and speed towards the Somali coast.

103. At approximately 1130 hours, the *Churchill* fired warning shots in the direction of the *Al Bisarat*, causing the vessel to stop. Between approximately 1130 and 1430 hours, the *Churchill* attempted to establish communications with the *Al*

Bisarat, issuing verbal warnings that it would begin to take more aggressive actions to obtain compliance with its requests. Towards the end of a three-hour standoff, the *Churchill* again fired warning shots in the direction of the *Al Bisarat*. Following this action, the pirates capitulated and the *Al Bisarat* broke radio silence, communicating with the *Churchill*. Anticipating their arrest, some of the pirates hid their weapons on board the *Al Bisarat* and some threw their weapons overboard. Then, shortly before 1500 hours, United States naval personnel boarded the *Al Bisarat*, took the 10 pirates into custody and located the weapons that had been hidden. The pirates were transferred to the custody of the authorities of the Government of Kenya on Sunday, 25 February. They are currently being held in the coastal city of Mombasa, Kenya, awaiting criminal prosecution for acts of piracy.

V. Analysis of trends and patterns of arms embargo violations

A. Continued militarization and greater instability

104. The militarization of Somalia by the three principal antagonists, the business elite and the other important groups, including pirate groups, and clans feuding over natural resources continues its forward momentum uninterrupted. The Monitoring Group has noted that, because of the continuous flow of arms, military materiel and financial support entering Somalia — regardless of the fundamental source — the process of militarization continues to feed the general pattern of instability and insecurity. The Monitoring Group also observes an increasing rate of overall militarization and notes that there appears to be a correspondingly greater volatility of the security situation, particularly in central and southern Somalia. This pattern of militarization and the trend towards increasing volatility greatly increases the chances of more fighting and the resulting loss of life. That this is the case was demonstrated by the heavy fighting that took place in and around Mogadishu during January, February and March 2006 involving opposition alliance members — warlords of local administrations and dissident TFG ministers, business elite and militants.

105. Clandestine State support is an integral part of the ongoing process of militarization in Somalia. The Monitoring Group noted the pattern of State support for major antagonists in its report of 4 October 2005. The trend continues, but is more pronounced in the current mandate than during the previous mandate. Increasing numbers of States are making clandestine contributions to their respective clients, in violation of the arms embargo. This activity contributes dangerously to greater instability, in an already highly unstable situation. Independent of the exact nature of the support provided, this phenomenon, per se, is highly provocative and adds to the unpredictable nature of the security situation in Somalia, with a possible negative impact on the relations of certain States in the region. For example, the potential exists for a negative spillover effect on regional State-to-State relations — at least three Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) members are involved in the clandestine contributions, two of them to the same major antagonist and the third to another.

106. Since TFG, the militant fundamentalists and the Mogadishu-based opposition alliance all have State support, and there is no meaningful political reconciliation apparent on the horizon, each of the main Somali antagonists will want to be on a

military par with the others in order to protect its status vis-à-vis the others and its own particular vested interests. Each contributing State has its own agenda and set of interests in supporting the side of its choice. Accordingly, it is clear that there is no systematic, coherent or unified approach to solving the militarization problem of Somalia to the benefit of Somali civil society. The clandestine support of individual States is narrowly defined and motivated by self-interest. As a result, the Monitoring Group sees no end to the trend of continued clandestine State support and, therefore, no end to the ongoing militarization in the near future.

107. Another major contributing factor, on the supply side, that nurtures and feeds the instability in central and southern Somalia and that adds significantly to the militarization process is the arms supermarket in Mogadishu, BAM. BAM has been dealt with at length in previous Monitoring Group reports — identifying those that supply significant quantities of arms for sale and those that rely heavily on BAM for new purchases. It is supplied with arms by a number of sources, one of the most important being the arms-trading networks that obtain fresh supplies from and through well-entrenched and secretive smuggling networks operating out of Yemen, among other places. During the current mandate period, the Monitoring Group received information on numerous arms consignments that arrived at BAM, as well as specific and detailed information on purchases by members of the Mogadishu-based opposition and the militants (see annex I). In general, the significant parties making regular purchases from BAM are members of the opposition alliance based in Mogadishu, including dissident TFG ministers, militant fundamentalists — including sharia courts — pirate groups and sub-clans engaged in ongoing feuds over resources.

108. There are different armed sub-clans and clans engaged in natural resource-based armed confrontations and fighting. Two examples are (a) the Reer Hassan and Reer Dini of the Marehaan, located in the Luuq area of the Gedo Region, the Sheekhaal of the Hawiye clan and Biimaal of the Dir clan, located in the Kismaayo area, and (b) the Sa'ad and Saleeban in the Mudug region of central Somalia, who are fighting over water. In the latter case, in January 2006, the fighting over control of a water tanker resulted in the deaths of more than 15 people. The foregoing does not represent all of the sub-clans involved in feuds over natural resources, or other local feuds; rather, it is indicative of the problem of militarization in this context. The named clans and others are involved in a continuous process of obtaining arms and other military supplies.

109. The Sa'ad are also known as the Somali Marines, the armed pirate group (see para. 90 above). As noted in section IV.B above, the Somali pirates have caused great insecurity along the Somali coast. Their role in the militarization process, albeit not central to the main political contest among the three principal antagonists, contributes an important piece of the mosaic of militarization and instability.

110. There is yet another set of very powerful individuals from the economic realm who are generally referred to in the finance section of reports of the Monitoring Group. They are the business elite: the owners and operators of the business cartels and associated businesses, headquartered in Mogadishu, with operations throughout southern and central Somalia and in foreign countries. They buy arms and military materiel, in violation of the arms embargo, to protect their vested interests, and have well-armed and -maintained militias. However, they also have a peculiar, dual role to play in the overall militarization process: they can be both buyers of arms and

military materiel and suppliers of arms, military materiel and financial support to the three principal political antagonists — TFG, the Mogadishu-based opposition alliance and the militant fundamentalists. Their dual role and the relationships noted are not new. The Monitoring Group has noted in its past reports arms embargo violations committed by certain of these businessmen and individuals of the principal antagonists.

111. The businessmen cooperate among themselves by pooling their military resources, supply — lend, contribute and sell — military resources to the main antagonists and regularly buy arms to keep their own militias at a high state of readiness. The ultimate purpose of all such actions is to protect their economic vested interests, by whatever means necessary. For the powerful business elite, the main order of the day is to ensure that its financial empires continue to survive and that the money continues to flow — to them!

B. The geography of militarization — a picture of instability

112. The Monitoring Group, in its report of 4 October 2005, described in general terms the relative geographic distribution of the two main antagonists in Somalia at the time: TFG and the Mogadishu-based opposition. Puntland (TFG President Yusuf's former local administration) and Somaliland (a self-declared independent state) aside, the Monitoring Group described the approximate partitioning of central and southern Somalia into two parts by an imaginary line extending from the south-west, starting at a point on the Kenya border with Somalia about halfway between the coast and the border with Ethiopia, and extending to the north-east, circumventing the city of Baidoa to the west as it proceeds north-east and ending approximately in the Hiraan region for TFG and the Galgaduud region for the opposition. The TFG area of influence was west of the line and the opposition's east of the line. The city of Jowhar and the Jowhar local administration, located north and west of Mogadishu, were a TFG enclave on opposition land. The maintenance of that de facto geographic division was somewhat ensured by the perceived military capability of each side and by the implied threat of its use against the other.

113. Although the basic fact of opposition to an established and functioning central Government inside Somalia remains, the geographic configuration of the opposition, as well as that of TFG and the other Somali actors identified in the present report, has changed from that of the previous mandate, which ended in October 2005. Accordingly, the landscape of militarization in central and southern Somalia has become more complex, as described below.

114. The geographical area of primary influence of TFG has become smaller, although its military power is still located essentially to the west of the imaginary line described above. Its principal stronghold is in the Bakool region, which borders Ethiopia. It has lost the enclave of Jowhar to the Mogadishu-based opposition; as a result, President Yusuf relocated the TFG militia from the Kongo military camp near Jowhar to the Bakool region. TFG influence over the Hiraan region is not strong. In the Bay region, TFG and the Mogadishu-based opposition alliance share uneasy influence over Baidoa.

115. The opposition alliance based in Mogadishu has also incurred changes. The warlord leader of the Jowhar local administration has joined forces with it; however, in spite of this addition, the alliance has been weakened both through the loss of

other powerful alliance members and by the loss of some of the areas formerly under its geographical control and influence. As a result, the area previously under the umbrella of influence of the Mogadishu-based opposition, effectively located east of the imaginary line, has been severely reduced in size and fragmented by the withdrawal of the militants from the alliance. Besides the militants, other alliance members' allegiance to the opposition has become questionable. At the time of the writing of the present report (the last week of March 2006), opposition membership is uncertain and may be in decline.

116. The militant Islamic fundamentalists and their confederates — warlords and the business elite — that were affiliated with the Mogadishu-based opposition and made up part of the security shield against TFG have moved out from underneath the security umbrella of the opposition. They have become the third major antagonist. Following the withdrawal, a number of bloody military engagements took place between the militants and the opposition alliance during the first three months of 2006. As a result of the fighting, the opposition has lost additional areas previously under its influence to the militants.

117. As of the writing of the present report, the situation between the militants and the remnants of the opposition alliance is fluid because of fighting over the control of certain areas, especially in the Mogadishu area. The current approximate areas of geographical influence of the militants and the opposition are described below.

118. The militants significantly influence or control much of Mogadishu (roughly 80 per cent, as at the end of March 2006), including the area surrounding Daynile airport, Bakaraaha and more. In the areas surrounding Mogadishu they control areas such as the port of El Ma'an, Easley airport, Baledogle airport, Afgooye and Medina, to name a few. While the opposition has been pushed to the north-east side of Mogadishu to an area known as Karen, it also continues to have some influence over the Daynile airport proper. In the area surrounding Mogadishu, it has control over Jowhar.

119. In other areas to the east of the imaginary line, the militants influence considerable portions, to the exclusion of the opposition: the Galgaduud region of central Somalia is heavily influenced by the militants, including Dhusamareeb, and areas south of Mogadishu, including all of the Lower Shabelle region south to areas surrounding Kismaayo, and further south of Kismaayo to the Rachiamboni area, near the border with Kenya, and to the north and west in those areas along the Kenya border to the Dhoble area.

120. As indicated in the section III above, the business elite also has powerful and well-armed militias. Its business operations are spread throughout central and southern Somalia, cutting across clan lines and local administration boundaries. Some of them are strongly affiliated with the militants. (For a geographic perspective of the scope of their operations, see map 1.)

121. Also adding to the landscape of militarization are two other general groups: sub-clans involved in ongoing feuds for reasons including natural resources, and pirate groups (see section IV.B). For the sake of added geographic perspective on militarization, the Monitoring Group has also taken note of the disposition in various central and southern regions of a number of ongoing violent clan feuds over control of natural resources and other issues. The clans involved regularly buy arms at the BAM.

122. The resulting mosaic, or geographical pattern of militarization involving the multiple main actors, as depicted in map 2, visually suggests widespread instability, particularly in central and southern Somalia. It also suggests the widespread existence, on a grand scale, of the availability of armaments and associated military equipment held by the various actors. The Monitoring Group knows from its investigative work that these same actors are continuously engaged in the process of regularly resupplying themselves with arms and military materiel brought into Somalia, all in violation of the arms embargo.


Map 2
Geography of Militarization
Gulf of Aden
Djibouti
Somalia
Ethiopia
Kenya
Militants/Opposition/TFG
Will presence at Baidoa
Militants
OA
TFG
Militants control 80%
of Mogadishu
Indian
Ocean
MILITANTS
JVA
Based on UN Map
Legend
Acts of Piracy
-TFG Transitional Federal Government
-OA Opposition Alliance
-JVA Jubba Valley Alliance
-M Militants
Clan Feuds, about 15

C. The militant fundamentalists as a third force

A third force

123. Since its advent in 2004, the Monitoring Group has been observing and reporting on the activities of the militants in Somalia and their involvement in arms embargo violations. Since that time, the militants have grown more powerful politically, economically and militarily. Accordingly, the Monitoring Group now considers the militant fundamentalists to be a third force contending for power at the national level on a par with TFG and the alliance of the Mogadishu-based opposition groups, which includes warlords in charge of local administrations and dissident TFG ministers, among others.

124. The Monitoring Group considers militant Islamic fundamentalists in Somalia to be those fundamentalists who have demonstrated a willingness to use violence in their struggle for political power at the national level for the purpose of attaining their principal objective: the creation of an Islamic State, ruled by sharia law. In Somalia the militant fundamentalists have been generally known by the name Al Itihad Al Islaami or Al Itisaam, and they include the sharia courts. They, like TFG and the Mogadishu-based opposition groups, have been receiving and buying arms and other forms of military support and obtaining financial support on a sustained basis.

125. In its past reports, the Monitoring Group has regularly identified individual militants associated with Al Itihad and the sharia courts as having been involved in committing arms embargo violations on an ongoing basis. The Monitoring Group has also reported that the militants were in the process of increasingly organizing themselves and, as an organization, becoming more militarily capable and powerful. During the process of building their capabilities, including their organizational strength, the militants, especially certain individuals and the sharia courts, joined the loose alliance of Mogadishu-based opposition groups to oppose TFG. In the view of the Monitoring Group, this afforded the militants the opportunity to maintain a low profile and gave them the time and protection they needed to build their organization, strength and capability.

126. Effectively, until a little over six months ago, there were generally considered to be only two principal antagonists in central and southern Somalia: TFG and the Mogadishu opposition groups. But with the convening by the militants of the conference entitled Somali Union and Salvation Council, held in Mogadishu from 26 to 30 September 2005, the militants signalled their readiness to move out from under the umbrella of the opposition to assert themselves as an independent force, with a political agenda and the economic backing and military capability to be a credible contender for power in Somalia.

Objectives, strategies and tactics

127. The main objective of the militants is to make Somalia an Islamic fundamentalist State, controlled through the application of sharia law. To that end, the militants have taken full advantage of the window of opportunity afforded by the lack of an established and effective central Government, and the continued hostile standoff between, on the one hand, President Yusuf and supporters of TFG and, on the other, the dissident ministers and other Mogadishu-based opposition elements.

128. The militants have been consolidating their political gains, multiplying the numbers and locations of sharia courts and their militias, and continuing to build their overall military capability. The sharia courts are the vanguard of the militants. Additional information obtained by the Monitoring Group clearly indicates that, like TFG and the opposition, the militants are aggressively carving out areas of geographic influence and control, where they are expanding and attempting to solidify their power base. One of the first visible signs of their presence in an area is the establishment of a sharia court there.

129. Among the immediate interests of the militants are to protect the successes that they have established in Somalia in order to help ensure their long-term survival. To that end, they will continue to oppose the establishment of a central Government in Somalia, unless they are an integral part of it or they are the Government. They are aware that a Government hostile to them would try to eliminate or control them, as they experienced once before in Somalia. An example of their intent to protect themselves from the threat of TFG becoming established as the central Government in Somalia was noted by the Monitoring Group following the signing, on 5 January 2006, of the Aden Declaration in Yemen, which was promoted and facilitated by Ali Abdullah Saleh, President of Yemen. The Aden Declaration resulted in discussions between TFG and the opposition in Mogadishu during January, suggesting that Kismaayo be seriously considered as the likely venue for the first plenary parliamentary session of TFG in Somalia. It proved to be a highly contentious issue. In a move that was clearly intended to prevent the session from taking place there and as a demonstration of military strength, the militants deployed heavily armed militia contingents to various locations in the area surrounding Kismaayo. The militants maintained that threatening posture until Kismaayo was no longer an option for the session.

130. In addition, the militants know that they must protect their financial interests and networks inside Somalia. The militants have strong financial-support networks that they rely on to help finance their operations. They continue to obtain financial support from their business operations in Somalia, including from remittance companies and certain telecommunications companies, and private donors located outside of Somalia.

The militants' military capability

131. The militants have been obtaining arms and military materiel through direct State support, from arms-trading networks supplying BAM and from other sources (see section II and annex I). They have been organizing their militias along more traditional military lines, with a central command and control structure and clearly identified leaders, some of whom have been named in previous Monitoring Group Final reports as being involved in arms embargo violations.

132. The Monitoring Group has information indicating that the military forces of the militants consist of a number of different elements, including militias of certain telecommunications and remittance businesses, a secretive group of specially trained individuals who are tasked with carrying out assassinations, and sharia courts. The sharia courts are expanding and are the most visible armed wing of the militants. The militant leadership has militarily enhanced the capacity of the militias of the sharia courts and the other elements through continued acquisition of arms and regular military training, an important portion of which is provided by foreign

trainers. They have established military training camps and mobile training programmes in various areas of central and southern Somalia, including Mogadishu. In many cases, the training is intense and rigorous and may include guerrilla tactics, explosives training and shooting and sniper skills, along with more standard military skills, adapted to the Somali context.

133. During the first three months of 2006, militias belonging to the militants, including militias of certain members of the business elite, were engaged in numerous bloody battles in and around Mogadishu against opposition militias and certain businessmen who were members of the newly formed Alliance for Peace Restoration and Combat against Terror (APRCT). The fighting fundamentally established the militants' intent to use violence and their greatly enhanced military capability. In particular, the battles demonstrated their fighting ability, organizational strength, leadership and, importantly, their will. During the fighting in February, the militants showed their organizational capacity and strength by mobilizing about 119 technicals, 8 armoured personnel carriers and 7 pieces of artillery. They also employed the services of foreign fighters and used shoulder-fired anti-tank weapons, including the LAW (M72-series lightweight anti-armour weapon). Another important result of the fighting was that the militants severely degraded the overall military capability of APRCT by overrunning and capturing opposition territory in and around Mogadishu, destroying or capturing military equipment and killing or capturing opposition militia members. As an added note that demonstrates the militants' extremism, the Monitoring Group has received credible information from multiple reliable sources that they have engaged in the beheading of a number of captured members of the opposition's militias.

134. Also, the Monitoring Group believes that as a result of the fighting between the two sides and the birth of APRCT, the militant fundamentalists have responded in kind by forming the Council for Uprising and Defending the Religion and the People. This type of response is indicative of their intent to persevere along military lines and may represent a move to escalate violence to accomplish their main objective.

D. Vested interests

135. The establishment of TFG in Somalia as a viable central Government is not in the interests of the powerful Somali actors, including dissident TFG Ministers, warlords and heads of local administrations, business elite associated with business cartels, militant fundamentalists, arms traders at BAM and pirate groups. There are, effectively, two kinds of vested interests represented by these actors: economic and ideological. Protection of both drives arms embargo violations. In the first instance, all of these groups, including the militants, who have well-established means of financial support, both inside and outside of Somalia, have clearly identifiable economic vested interests to protect.

136. Perhaps with the exception of the arms-trading networks, all the actors have the military capability and intent — at times demonstrated and at times threatened — to fight for those interests, either singly or in convenient ad hoc alliances. The most obvious example of the latter has been the ongoing and grand standoff between TFG and opposition groups based in Mogadishu, which has been as much for hidden economic reasons as for publicly touted political reasons. They

also protect those interests from encroachment by the others, as in the recent fighting between businessman Bashir Rage and business cartel boss Abukar Omar Adani over economic issues in connection with the seaport of El Ma'an.

137. Ideological vested interests have come to the forefront during the current mandate of the Monitoring Group. As has been addressed elsewhere in the present report, the militants have thrust themselves into the forefront of the struggle in Somalia, to become one of the three major antagonists. The principal and avowed ideological interest, or objective, of the militants is the creation of an Islamic State in Somalia, run by sharia law. They have demonstrated their organizational and military power and established themselves as a bona fide main antagonist in the ongoing struggle in Somalia.

138. Absent the existence of a viable and strong central Government for about 15 years, both kinds of vested interests have had virtually all of those years to grow and develop strong roots inside Somalia, and strong support networks outside of Somalia. In any case, powerful economic and ideological interests — both easily translatable into political, financial and military support from different quarters — continue to hold the establishment of a central Government in Somalia at bay and continue to drive arms embargo violations, all at the great expense of a very badly worn down and abused Somali civil society.

VI. Capacity-building

Yemen

139. During its visit to Sana'a, the Monitoring Group met with the Commander of the Yemeni Coast Guard to discuss the problem of illegal arms-trading networks operating between Yemen and Somalia. The Commander reiterated the Government of Yemen's commitment to fully comply with all the Security Council resolutions concerning the arms embargo on Somalia, but he noted that the Coast Guard was in need of capacity-building assistance to effectively combat the smuggling of arms by the arms-trading groups (he referred to a letter circulated to the Security Council sanctions Committee on Somalia dated 26 January 2006, outlining specific needs). On the basis of its knowledge of the problem faced by the Government of Yemen in attempting to curtail the activities of the arms-trading networks transporting arms from Yemen across the Gulf of Aden to the arms market in Somalia, the meetings held between the Monitoring Group and the Government of Yemen during 2005 and 2006 and the above-mentioned letter, the Monitoring Group recommends that the request for capacity-building assistance be considered by the Security Council.

Regional

140. The International Maritime Organization organized two seminars to address the rampant increase in piracy incidents off the coast of Somalia. The Monitoring Group was invited to Muscat, Oman, and Mombasa, Kenya, to participate and to give a presentation of its findings in relation to the violations of the arms embargo.

141. At both seminars, detailed resolutions were adopted to improve the general security of the maritime domain, and these could form the basis for the capacity-building initiative in the region. The main points from the two seminars that could be highlighted to provide capacity-building aid are:

(a) Assistance in the development and implementation of a national maritime security policy to safeguard maritime trade from unlawful acts;

(b) Assistance in the establishment of regional maritime information centres through which the States participating in the seminars could share and exchange security-related information for the aim of preventing or combating unlawful acts against seafarers and ships;

(c) Assistance in improving national and regional cooperation with a view to ensuring that persons committing criminal acts against seafarers, ships, port facilities and pirates do not evade prosecution;

(d) Assistance to coastal States affected by piracy and armed robbery against ships. This should include the enhancement of capabilities to combat piracy, such as making available maritime resources capable of conducting anti-piracy operations and the provision of training for personnel to enable them to become more effective in combating piracy;

(e) Assistance in the implementation of appropriate security measures and procedures and effective continuous compliance with the requirements of special measures to enhance maritime security contained in chapter XI-2 of the 1974 International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, as amended, and the International Code for the Security of Ships and Port Facilities.

142. Separately, through the initiative of IMO, a regional maritime search-and-rescue centre has been set up in Mombasa to cater for the sea areas of Kenya, Seychelles, Somalia and the United Republic of Tanzania. To date Kenya, Seychelles and the United Republic of Tanzania have signed a memorandum of understanding to enhance cooperation for meeting the objective of the centre. Assistance should be provided for Somalia to be able to be an active member of this organization. Furthermore, technical assistance could be made available to all countries to maintain and improve on their present capabilities.

143. Finally, IMO, on 23 November 2005 at its biennial Assembly, adopted resolution A 979 (24) concerning the increasing incidents of piracy and armed robbery against ships in waters off Somalia, in which it requested the Secretary-General of IMO "to provide, within the means of the organization and the scope of the present resolution, technical assistance to Somalia and to the nearby States to take appropriate action in the circumstances".

144. On 15 March 2006, the Security Council urged Member States to use naval vessels and military aircraft in the fight against piracy and armed robbery off the coast of Somalia. In a wide-ranging presidential statement on the situation in Somalia, the Council encouraged "Member Sates whose naval vessels and military aircraft operate in international waters and airspace adjacent to the coast of Somalia to be vigilant to any incident of piracy therein and to take appropriate action to protect merchant shipping, in particular the transportation of humanitarian aid, against any such act, in line with relevant international law" (S/PRST/2006/11).

145. In this regard, the Security Council welcomed the communiqué of the IGAD Council of Ministers meeting in Jowhar of 29 November 2005, in which it decided to coordinate strategies and action plans to face this common challenge in close collaboration with the international community. The Council further urged

cooperation among all States, particularly those of the region, and active prosecution of piracy offences.

VII. Coordination with States and organizations

A. States

Due process

146. The Monitoring Group sent letters to individual States and businesses identified in connection with information about alleged involvement in arms embargo violations, as noted in section II above. Replies received by the Monitoring Group by the time of the completion of the present report have been cited in the information on alleged arms embargo violations in section II and are reproduced in annexes II to V.

Kenya

147. In carrying out the responsibilities outlined in its mandate, as set out in Security Council resolution 1630 (2005), the Monitoring Group made numerous attempts to solicit the cooperation and assistance of the Government of Kenya during the current mandate, including through a letter sent to the Minister for Foreign Affairs dated 21 February 2006 and a letter sent to the Permanent Representative of Kenya to the United Nations dated 22 February 2006. Personal attempts were made by Monitoring Group members, both in Nairobi and Mombasa, to establish meaningful and productive contacts with the Government. In all cases, the Monitoring Group received no response from the Government of Kenya.

United Arab Emirates

148. The Monitoring Group is very appreciative of the cooperation and specific investigative assistance extended to it by the Government of the United Arab Emirates through its letter dated 22 March 2006. The Monitoring Group looks forward to continued cooperation with the United Arab Emirates in the future.

Yemen

149. Consistent with the spirit and substance of the excellent working relationship established between the Government of Yemen and the Monitoring Group during the mandate period that ended in October 2005, the Government of Yemen again extended its cooperation to the Monitoring Group during the current mandate.

150. On the invitation of the Government of Yemen, the Monitoring Group travelled to Sana'a during the last week of March 2006. Throughout the visit very productive and transparent meetings were held between the Monitoring Group and Yemeni Government officials. Information and documents were exchanged between the two sides. The Monitoring Group is grateful to the Government of Yemen for the cooperation and substantive assistance it has provided.

B. Organizations

151. The Monitoring Group has had contacts and exchanged views with the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1533 (2004) and the Al-Qaida/Taliban Monitoring Team established pursuant to resolution 1526 (2004). Members of the Monitoring Group also met with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Somalia, François Lonseny Fall, during which they exchanged views and information.

VIII. Conclusions and recommendations

A. Conclusions

152. The security situation in central and southern Somalia continues to be highly unstable and increasingly volatile, resulting in violent confrontations between and among different main actors. The Monitoring Group has identified the six main actors in central and southern Somalia: TFG, the Mogadishu-based opposition alliance, the militant fundamentalists, the business elite, pirate groups and feuding sub-clans. Arms, military materiel and financial support continue to flow like a river to these various actors, in violation of the arms embargo. Three fundamental sources feed this flow: a widening circle of States — each with its own agenda — arms-trading groups, and economically powerful individuals and the business elite.

153. Powerful opposition to the establishment of TFG continues, bringing the process to a virtual standstill. Notwithstanding extensive international support, both clandestine and overt, TFG remains unable to assert its authority to become established as a functioning central Government. The principal antagonists — the Mogadishu-based opposition alliance, the militant fundamentalists and the business elite — opposed to the establishment of the central Government are economically and militarily strong, are well organized and have demonstrated their intent to use deadly violence to protect their interests and pursue their respective agendas. Their collective and, in certain cases, individual strength, resources and capabilities are greater than those of TFG.

154. Added to this mix is the secondary row of main actors, the feuding sub-clans and pirate groups that are aggressively and, at times, violently, taking advantage of the lack of central authority to pursue criminal activities or attempting to resolve ongoing clan feuds through violent armed confrontations. As a result, the overall process and momentum of militarization also continues alarmingly throughout central and southern Somalia.

155. The national-level standoff between TFG and the Mogadishu-based opposition has now mutated to include a powerful militant fundamentalist element. The structures of the TFG alliance and the Mogadishu-based opposition have been reconfigured, due to both political and military factors. The most notable factors involve the withdrawal of the Jowhar local administration from TFG to join the opposition and the rise of the militant fundamentalists as a third force, ideologically motivated and now independent of the opposition, but still in opposition to the establishment of TFG as a central Government.

156. As a result, the Mogadishu-based opposition has also been severely degraded by a series of bloody fights with the militants' militia forces, resulting in the militants' strengthening of their hold over significant geographical areas formerly under the influence of the opposition. As an example, as at the time of writing of the present report, the militants are in control of roughly 80 per cent of Mogadishu.

157. All of the six main actors are heavily armed, organized and aggressively keen to protect and ensure the survival of their respective vested interests, be they fundamentally economic, as in the case of the local administrations run by warlords and the huge and powerful business cartels of the business elite, or ideological, as in the case of the militants. It is the view of the Monitoring Group that economic vested interests, and now the ideological interests of the militants, are the driving forces behind the opposition to the establishment of a central Government in Somalia.

158. The pirate groups and the feuding clans operate on the margins of the main contest between TFG and the principal antagonists. But they add immeasurably to the lawless trauma and widespread instability is today's Somalia.

B. Recommendations: integrated arms embargo and targeted sanctions

Integrated arms embargo

159. Considering the totality of the information contained in previous reports of the Panel of Experts and the Monitoring Group and the present report, and the ongoing nature of the highly unstable situation in Somalia, the Monitoring Group proposes again to the Security Council the concept of an integrated arms embargo for its reconsideration, with the possibility of its adoption and implementation. The Monitoring Group believes that an integrated arms embargo is necessary as a further measure towards reducing the total amounts of revenues that flow to the various main Somali actors and, correspondingly, the total amounts of arms that continue to be purchased with such revenues.

160. The Monitoring Group defines the concept of the integrated arms embargo as a process that involves the following aspects:

(a) Reaffirming and sustaining the arms embargo on Somalia, per Security Council resolution 733 (1992), paragraph 5;

(b) Implementing a trade embargo on the export of charcoal originating in Somalia;

(c) Implementing a ban on foreign vessels fishing in Somali waters and a trade embargo on the export of fish taken in Somali waters.

161. The purpose of the above approach is to enhance the overall effectiveness of the enforcement of the arms embargo on Somalia by reducing the funds available for the main actors mentioned elsewhere in the present report who have been engaged in the purchase of arms in violation of the arms embargo. The desired effect is to stem the unrestrained flow of arms into Somalia by key arms embargo violators — those who have gained the financial capacity through the accrual of revenues, in part, from exports of Somali charcoal and the issuance of rights to foreign businesses for fishing in the Somali exclusive economic zone.

162. The implementation of the proposal will depend on cooperation among States in the international community to ban and impose embargoes on illegal and unregulated activities not controlled by a Government, since it is related to trade with businesses in foreign countries. Further, the proposal can be implemented and enforced by an agreement among States in the international community until a Government in Somalia is properly in place.

163. The proposal is not intended to have a serious impact or impose restrictions on individuals in Somali civil society who are engaged in traditional, domestic and day-to-day subsistence activities for the purpose of local consumption. The Monitoring Group continues to recognize that the proposal will not have an impact on State-sponsored arms donations to Somalia.

Additional relevant information concerning charcoal to be considered together with the proposed integrated arms embargo

164. During the current mandate, the Monitoring Group has learned of a total of four documents,[4] prepared by the World Bank, the Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations and non-governmental organizations. Drawing the same conclusions concerning the destructive and harmful consequences for Somalia that continue to be caused by the rampant commercialization of charcoal and the resulting devastating environmental degradation of its limited forests.[4]

Targeted sanctions

165. In paragraph 3 (d) of its resolution 1630 (2005), the Security Council requested the Monitoring Group to continue refining and updating information on the draft list of individuals and entities who violate the measures implemented by Member States in accordance with resolution 733 (1992), inside and outside Somalia, and their active supporters, for possible future measures by the Council, and to present such information to the Committee as and when the Committee deems appropriate. The Monitoring Group continues to refine and update that draft list. In view of the investigative results presented in the previous reports of the Monitoring Group and the information contained in the present report, the Monitoring Group recommends that the Security Council consider applying targeted sanctions, e.g., in the form of travel bans and freezing of assets on the individuals and entities named in the draft list.

[4] (a) World Bank, "Somalia — from resilience towards recovery and development — a country economic memorandum for Somalia", report No. 34356-SO, 11 January 2006; (b) Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations, "Somalia — a case for protecting natural capital during a protracted complex emergency", Rome, 20 October 2004; (c) Ministry of Pastoral Development and Environment (Somaliland) and Candlelight for Health, Education and Environment, "Case study: impact of charcoal production on environment and the socio-economy of pastoral communities of Somaliland", January 2004, funded by NOVIB (Oxfam Netherlands). The study was conducted in Somaliland; (d) Candlelight for Health, Education and Environment, "Case study: alternative source of energy and reduction of dependence on charcoal in Somaliland", presented 4 December 2005, funded by NOVIB (Oxfam Netherlands).

Annex I

Arms purchases and sales at the Bakaraaha Arms Market investigated during the mandate period

Those conducting transaction at the Bakaraaha Market	*Type and quantity of arms and date of transaction*	*Comments*
Qanyare Afrah Mohamed, businessman and Minister for National Security in TFG	1 DShk and a variety of ammunition **24.08.2005**	Purchased the arms
	A variety of ammunition but mainly rockets for RPG-2 **06.09.2005**	Purchased the arms
	11 PKM and ammunition **20.09.2005**	Purchased the arms
	18 PKM **05.10.2005**	Purchased the arms through his representative Abdi Jilaoow
	Mines and ammunition for small arms **10.2005**	Purchased the arms
	Ammunition for Zu-23 and DShK **31.10.2005**	Purchased the arms
	1 B-10, 1 Sekawe **05.11.2005**	Purchased the arms
	180 AK-47 **11.2005**	Placed the order with traders at BAM
	10 PKM, 2 DShK and ammunition **03.12.2005**	Purchased the arms
	A variety of ammunition **05.12.2005**	Purchased the arms
	6 RPG-7 and 2 DShK **06.12.2005**	Purchased the arms
	A variety of ammunition, including for Zu-23 **13.12.2005**	Purchased the arms

Those conducting transaction at the Irtogte Market	*Type and quantity of arms and date of transaction*	*Comments*
	10 boxes of ammunition for AK-47, 10 boxes of ammunition for Zu-23 **03.01.2006**	Purchased the arms
	2 mortars and a variety of ammunition **14.01.2006**	Purchased the arms
Qanyare Abiweli, son of Qanyare Afrah Mohamed	6 PKM, 6 RPG-2 and ammunition **28.08.2005**	Purchased the arms
Rage Shiraar Bashir, businessman	1 B-10, 1 ZP-39 and ammunition **10.2005**	Purchased the arms
	1 B-10, 2 DShK **11.2005**	Purchased the arms
	1 DShk and ammunition **19.12.2005**	Purchased the arms
	16 PKM, 20 RPG-7 and a variety of ammunition **09.01.2006**	Purchased the arms
Saleeban clan representative (fighting the Sa'ad clan)	Some AK-47 and RPG-7 **10.01.2006**	Purchased the arms
Muse Sudi Yalahow, Minister of Commerce in TFG	4 120 mm mortars and ammunition for Zu-23, DShK, B-10 and ZP-39 **21.08.2005**	Purchased the arms
	A variety of ammunition **29.08.2005**	Purchased the arms
	40 Ak-47, ammunition for small arms, RPG-2 and 150 120 mm mortar shells **07.09.2005**	Purchased the arms
	50 AK-47, 10 RPG-2 and a variety of ammunition **24.09.2005**	Purchased the arms
	1 Zu-23, several B-10 **08.10.2005**	Muse Sudi placed an order. Waiting for shipment from Somaliland

Those conducting transaction at the Irtogte Market	*Type and quantity of arms and date of transaction*	*Comments*
	5 PKM, 1 B-1- and ammunition **10.2005**	Purchased the arms
	40 AK-47, 10 RPG-7, 60 120 mm mortar shells and a variety of ammunition **05.11.2005**	Purchased the arms
	1 DShK and a variety of ammunition **11.2005**	Purchased the arms
	1 Zu-23 and ammunition **03.12.2005**	Purchased the arms
	2 DShK and a variety of ammunition **26.12.2005**	Purchased the arms
Omar Muhammad Mohamud "Finish", Minister for Religion and Endowments in TFG. Controls the Mogadishu seaport and part of Mogadishu airport	2 DShK **10.09.2005**	Purchased the arms
	30 AK-47 **28.12.2005**	Purchased the arms
Habsade Mohamed Ibrahim, MP, in control of Baidoa	30 AK-47, 7 82 mm mortars, 2 DShK and a variety of ammunition **21.08.2005**	Purchased the arms
	Ammunition for RPG-2, RPG-7 and Zu-123 **10.09.2005**	Grenades for RPG-7 cost $100 a unit
	24 AK-47, 2 DShK and a variety of ammunition **28.09.2005**	Through the representative of Indohaadde, Mohammed Hassan
	50 AK-47, 8 PKM, 11 RPG-2 and a variety of ammunition **08.10.2005**	Purchased the arms
	8 RPG-7, 1 DShK, 4 120 mm mortars and a variety of ammunition **31.10.2005**	Purchased the arms

Those conducting transaction at the Irtogte Market	*Type and quantity of arms and date of transaction*	*Comments*
	10 RPG-7, 11 mortars and ammunition for small arms **11.2005**	Purchased the arms
	8 PKM, 10 RPG-7 and 3 DShK **14.01.2006**	Purchased the arms
Barre Aden Shire "Hirale", Minister for Reconstruction and Resettlement in TFG, in charge of Kismaayo port	200 120 mm mortar shells **10.2005**	The ammunition came from Hargeysa
Abukar Omar Adaan, businessman, financier, Al Itihad Al Islaami	A variety of ammunition **10.2005**	Purchased it through his company "Banaadir"
	120 AK-47, 24 PKM and a variety of ammunition **02.11.2005**	Purchased it through his company "Banaadir"
	2 DShK **25.11.2005**	Purchased the arms at BAM and gave them to the sharia court Al-Furqaan
	2 120 mm mortars and ammunition for mortars and B-10 **13.12.2005**	Purchased it through his company "Banaadir"
	20 PKM, 4 DShK, 1 Zu-23 and ammunition **10.01.2006**	Purchased the arms
BAM traders	A number of arms **21.08.2005**	Arms were sent by traders to Baidoa, where clans are fighting at Lidaale
	A number of AK-47 and a variety of ammunition **23.08.2005**	Imported to BAM by a group of traders
	6 Zu-23 and ZP-39 and 14 rotation systems for Zu-23 and ZP-39 **27.08.2005**	Imported to BAM by a group of traders
	80 PKM, 36 RPG-7 and a variety of ammunition **28.08.2005**	Imported via small ports east of Bossaso to BAM by a group of traders

Those conducting transaction at the Jelaqle Market	*Type and quantity of arms and date of transaction*	*Comments*
	300 AK-47, 40 PKM, a variety of ammunition and mines **29.08.2005**	From Yemen (arms-trading network) for several traders
	1 DShK and 1 Zu-23 **30.08.2005**	Imported to BAM by Daahir Muse Qaldan
	250 AK-47, 24 PKM, 20 RPG-2 and ammunition for small arms **03.09.2005**	Imported to BAM by Mohammed Hassan via an airstrip under his control (El Ahmed) near Merka
	250 AK-47, 3 DShK, 120 shells for the B-10 and a variety of ammunition **05.09.2005**	Imported to BAM by a group of traders
	90 AK-47 and ammunition **10.09.2005**	Imported by traders via Beletweyne
	A number of AK-47, PKM and a variety of ammunition **12.09.2005**	Imported to BAM by a group of traders
	182 AK-47, 32 PKM, 4 DShK and a variety of ammunition **19.09.2005**	Imported to BAM by Qorsheel, Abdullahi Madobe and Mohammed Hassan
	450 AK-47, 2 Zu-23, 130 pistols and a variety of ammunition **27.09.2005**	Imported by traders from Somaliland
	182 AK-47 and 110 pistols **04.10.2005**	Imported by traders via Galkayo and Beletweyne
	A shipment of small arms and ammunition arrived at BAM **10.2005**	Imported via Bossaso, Galkayo and Beletweyne to Mogadishu
	160 AK-47 **10.2005**	Imported by traders via Galkayo
	Approximately 8,000 pieces of ammunition for small arms and anti-tank and anti aircraft guns **10.2005**	Imported by traders from Bossaso. Half of the shipment was bought by Osman Hassan Ali "Atto"

Those conducting transaction at the Irtogte Market	*Type and quantity of arms and date of transaction*	*Comments*
	220 AK-47, 30 PKM, 8 DShK, 4 Dhuunshilke[a] and a variety of ammunition **02.11.2005**	Imported by traders via Galkayo and Beletweyne
	10 DShK, 10 Zu-23-2, 5 Zu-23-4 and ammunition **26.11.2005**	Imported by Hersi Adaan Rooble, Deputy Minister of Ports and Marine Transport, from Yemen (arms-trading networks) via Bossaso
	60 PKM, 8 DShK, 11 120 mm mortars, 4 Zu-23 without rotation system and a variety of ammunition **30.11.2005**	Imported by traders from Yemen (arms-trading networks) via Galkayo
	400 AK-47, an unknown quantity of PKM and a variety of ammunition **11.12.2005**	Imported by traders from Yemen (arms-trading networks) via Puntland, Galkayo and Beletweyne
	200 AK-47 and large quantities of ammunition for Zu-23, B-10, ZP-39 and mortars **13.12.2005**	Imported by traders
	12 DShK, 2 Zu-23, 2 Sekawe[b] and a variety of ammunition **17.12.2005**	Imported by traders
	2 Zu-23 and ammunition **20.12.2005**	Imported by traders from Puntland via Galkayo and Beletweyn
	120 AK-47, 16 PKM, 8 DShK and ammunition for small arms **26.12.2005**	Imported by traders
	2 Zu-23, 2 B-10, 500 boxes of ammunition for Zu-23, 300 boxes of ammunition for AK-47 **02.01.2006**	Imported by traders and stored at Huriwaa (Mogadishu)
	3 DShK, 1 ZP-39, 1 Zu-23 and ammunition **08.01.2006**	Imported by traders from Yemen (arms-trading networks) via Bossaso and Galkayo. Destined for Abdi Hassan Awale Qeybdiid but

Those conducting transaction at the Irtogte Market	*Type and quantity of arms and date of transaction*	*Comments*
		stolen in Galkayo by members of the Sa'ad clan
	A shipment of pistols, AK-47, RPG-7 and ammunition arrived at the BAM **09.01.2006**	Imported by Qorsheel and Deesood (traders), Galkayo and Beletweyne
	3,000 AK-47 and 1,000 PKM **30.03.2006**	This shipment arrived at BAM from Yemen (arms-trading networks) via Bossaso
Sheik Yusuf Mohamed Siyad "Indohaadde", warlord/ businessman, Governor of Lower Shabelle and associated with Al Itihad Al Islaami	2 DShK and ammunition **17.08.2005**	Purchased through his representative Mohammed Hassan
	120 AK-47, 14 PKM, 16 RPG-2 and a variety of ammunition **06.09.2005**	Purchased the arms
	80 AK-47, 1 DShK and ammunition **17.09.2005**	Purchased the arms
	20 AK-47 5 PKM **24.09.2005**	Purchased through his representative Mohammed Hassan
	400 pieces of ammunition for the B-10 and 200 pieces of ammunition for Zu-23 **27.09.2005**	Purchased the arms
	50 pistols, 70 AK-47 and 10 PKM **10.2005**	Purchased the arms
	95 AK-47, 16 RPG-7 and a variety of ammunition **11.2005**	Purchased the arms
	2 B-10, 2 DShK and ammunition **12.12.2005**	Purchased the arms
Biimaal clan representative	A variety of small arms **28.09.2005**	Are fighting the Sheekhaal clan in Kismaayo area
Mohamed Deylaaf, businessman	50 AK-47 and ammunition **11.2005**	Purchased the arms together with Abdi Wiif

Those conducting transaction at the Irtogte Market	*Type and quantity of arms and date of transaction*	*Comments*
Sharia courts	17 AK-47 and 1 DShK **21.08.2005**	Sharia court Ifka Halane purchased the arms
	4 RPG-7, 1 Dhuunshilke[a] and a variety of ammunition **22.08.2005**	Sharia court Ifka Halane purchased the arms
	22 AK-47, 8 PKM and ammunition **27.08.2005**	Sharia court Al-Furqaan purchased the arms. Based at KM4 near Sahafi Hotel
	10 AK-47, 3 RPG-2 and ammunition for small arms **29.08.2005**	Sharia court Ifka Halane purchased the arms
	15 AK-47 and ammunition for small arms **03.09.2005**	Sharia court Al-Furqaan purchased the arms
	50 AK-47, 6 PKM and ammunition **05.09.2005**	Sharia court Al-Furqaan and Shirkole (Circola) purchased the arms
	134 AK-47, 12 RPG-7 and a variety of ammunition **26.09.2005**	Purchased by the "Muslim Union Umbrella"
	1 DShK and 1 Dhuunshilke[a] **04.10.2005**	Sharia court Al-Furqaan received the arms. The arms were purchased by Sheik Mohammed Nuur, who is a businessman
	60 AK-47, 9 PKM, 12 RPG-7 and a variety of ammunition **05.11.2005**	Purchased by the "Muslim Union Umbrella"
	A variety of ammunition **11.2005**	Purchased by the "Muslim Union Umbrella"
	18 AK-47 and 4 PKM **12.12.2005**	Sharia court Ifka Halane purchased the arms
	40 AK-47, 1 Zu-23 and ammunition **19.12.2005**	Sharia court Siinaay purchased the arms
	15 AK-47, 2 PKM, 4 RPG-7 and ammunition **27.12.2005**	Sharia court Shirkole (Circola) purchased the arms

Those conducting transaction at the Irtogte Market	*Type and quantity of arms and date of transaction*	*Comments*
	1 B-10 and 100 boxes of ammunition for AK-47 **04.01.2006**	Sharia court Siinaay purchased the arms
	20 AK-47, 5 PKM, 4 RPG-2 and some ammunition **07.01.2006**	Sharia court Warshadda Anaha purchased the arms
	14 AK-47, 10 RPG-2 and ammunition **10.01.2006**	Sharia Court Ifka Halane purchased the arms
	2 DShK **25.11.2005**	Sharia court Al-Furqaan received the arms from Abukar Omar Adaan, who bought the arms at BAM
Botan Ise Alin "Haaraan Kunaar", Minister for Rehabilitation and Training of Militias in TFG	1 Zu-23 **10.2005**	Bought from the Duduble clan via traders at BAM. Mounted the Zu-23 on a truck
	3 PKM, 1 B-10 and ammunition **05.12.2005**	Purchased the arms
	7 PKM, 1 B-10, 1 mortar and ammunition **14.12.2005**	Purchased the arms
Sheekhaal clan representative	A variety of small arms **28.09.2005**	Are fighting the Biimaal clan in Kismaayo area
Osman Hassan Ali "Atto", Minister for Public Works and Housing in TFG	6 PKM, 12 RPG-2, some rifle-fired grenades and hand grenades **31.08.2005**	Purchased the arms
	20 AK-47, 2 120 mm mortars **07.09.2005**	Purchased the arms
	Approximately 4,000 pieces of ammunition for small arms, anti-tank and anti-aircraft guns **10.2005**	Purchased the arms
	4 RPG-7, 4 mortars and ammunition **28.12.2005**	Purchased the arms

Those conducting transaction at the Irregular Market	*Type and quantity of arms and date of transaction*	*Comments*
Mahamud Hassan Ali Gaabow "Adde", governor of Banaadir region	18 AK-47 **28.09.2005**	Purchased the arms
	1 DShK and 1 Dhuunshilke" **11.2005**	Purchased the arms
Ibrahim Umar Sebrye "Shaalwey", former mayor of Mogadishu	18 AK-47, 4 PKM, 4 RPG-2 and ammunition **15.08.2005**	Purchased the arms
	20 AK-47 and 2 PKM **04.09.2005**	Purchased the arms
	5 PKM, 5 RPG-7 and a variety of ammunition **03.10.2005**	Purchased the arms
	20 AK-47, 4 PKM **10.2005**	Purchased the arms
	18 AK-47, 4 RPG-7 and ammunition for small arms **11.2005**	Purchased the arms
	5 PKM and 1 DShK **21.12.2005**	Purchased the arms
Abdikadir Beebe, coordinator of militia stationed in Mogadishu	38 AK-47, 6 PKM, 1 DShK and a variety of ammunition **01.10.2005**	Purchased the arms
	2 DShK **10.2005**	Purchased the arms
	22 AK-47, 7 PKM and ammunition **11.2005**	Purchased the arms
Colonel Abdi Hassan Awale Qeybdiid, former police Chief, Banaadir region. He controls checkpoints between Afgooye and Mogadishu. Was arrested and released in Sweden	24 AK-47, 14 PKM and ammunition **10.2005**	Purchased the arms
	1 ZP-39 **11.2005**	Purchased the arms
	4 PKM and 2 DShK (and ordered 2 more) **27.11.2005**	Purchased the arms through his representative Abdi Odweeyne. On 29.11.2005 4 Toyota pickups arrived at the port of El Ma'an to mount the DShK on. Purchased the arms

Those conducting transaction at the Irtogte Market	*Type and quantity of arms and date of transaction*	*Comments*
		through taxes received from Sinkadheer checkpoint
	25 AK-47, 6 PKM and ammunition **20.15.2005**	Purchased the arms
Abdi Wiif, businessman. Has dhows with anti-aircraft guns that protect traders in the sea	12 AK-47 and 1 B-10 **21.08.2005**	Purchased the arms
	30 AK-47 and ammunition **06.11.2005**	Purchased the arms
	50 AK-47 and ammunition **11.2005**	Purchased the arms together with Mohamed Deylaaf
Aden Hashi Farah "Eyrow", leader of militia of the sharia courts	2 PKM, 10 RPG-2 and ammunition **05.09.2005**	Purchased the arms
	15 AK-47, 5 RPG-7, 6 PKM, 3 DShK and 3 Land Cruiser pickups to mount the DShK on **15.11.2005**	Received from former TNG President Abdiqassim Salad Hassan, who bought the arms at BAM
Abdirashid Iiqeyte, businessman, owner of Sahafi Hotel	15 AK-47, 2 PKM and a variety of ammunition **22.08.2005**	Purchased the arms
	40 AK-47 and a variety of ammunition **06.11.2005**	Purchased the arms
	45 AK-47 and 12 PKM **11.2005**	Purchased the arms
	50 AK-47, 7 PKM and ammunition **31.12.2005**	Purchased the arms
Sheik Hassan Dahir Aweys, leader of Al Itihad Al Islaami	3 PKM and a large quantity of ammunition **30.08.2005**	Purchased the arms
Rahaweyn clan representative	50 AK-47, 10 RPG-2 and a variety of ammunition **15.08.2005**	Purchased the arms
	40 AK-47 and ammunition **03.12.2005**	Purchased the arms

Those conducting transaction at the Irtogte Market	*Type and quantity of arms and date of transaction*	*Comments*
Abdi Nuur Siyad "Waal", freelance militia leader, new mayor of Mogadishu	4 PKM and 1 B-10 **10.12.2005**	Purchased the arms
	20 AK-47, 6 PKM, 1 DShK, ammunition and equipment for the militia **16.08.2005**	Purchased the arms
Ma'alin Hashi, militia leader of the Mataan sub-sub-clan	2 Sekawe" (anti-aircraft gun) **23.08.2005**	Purchased the arms
Ogaden from Afmadow	2 DShK and ammunition **31.08.2005**	Purchased the arms
Ogaden National Liberation Front, fights the Government of Ethiopia	11 PKM and 10 RPG-7 **13.09.2005**	The arms were sent by Mohammed Hassan (trader) to the Ethiopian border
"Dhagamfuur", deputy of Banaadir Governor	1 DShK and ammunition **04.09.2005**	Purchased the arms
	1 Dhuunshilke" and ammunition **20.12.2005**	Purchased the arms
	1 B-10 and a variety of ammunition **03.01.2006**	Purchased the arms
Agoonyar clan	40 AK-47 and 14 RPG-2 **20.09.2005**	Sub-sub-clan of Mohamed Dheere is fighting the clan of Ali Medhi at Miirtaqwo (Jowhar area)
Hussein Goley, businessman, counterfeiter and close to Al Itihad	1 Zu-23, 1 ZP-39 and ammunition **21.09.2005**	Purchased the arms
	1 Zu-23 **03.10.2005**	Bought for Abdi Jama
Wa'asle clan	20 AK-47, 4 RPG-7 and a variety of ammunition **01.10.2005**	Sub-clan of Wiif
"Irfo", Mayor of Afgooye	1 DShK and ammunition **10.2005**	Purchased the arms

Those conducting transaction at the Irtogte Market	*Type and quantity of arms and date of transaction*	*Comments*
Soft-drink factory	10 PKM **10.2005**	Purchased the arms
	40 AK-47, 6 RPG-7 and ammunition **07.01.2006**	Purchased the arms
"Afi", water purification company in Mogadishu	30 AK-47, 4 RPG-2 **10.2005**	Purchased the arms
Yusuf Mire Seeraar, warlord in Kismaayo	1 Zu-23 **28.11.2005**	Purchased the arms
Yusuf Dabaged, Governor of Hiraan region	2 DShK, 1 B-10 and large quantities of ammunition **29.11.2005**	Purchased the arms
Ugas Ali	12 AK-47 and 4 PKM **21.12.2005**	Purchased the arms
Sa'ad clan representative (fighting the Salebaan clan)	Some AK-47 and RPG-7 **10.01.2006**	Purchased the arms
Abdiqassim Salad Hassan, former TNG President	15 AK-47, 5 RPG-7, 6 PKM, 3 DShK and 3 Land Cruiser pickups to mount the DshK on **15.11.2005**	Purchased the arms for Aden Hashi Farah "Eyrow"
Nur Galaal Mohamed, General	8 PKM **12.10.2005**	Purchased the arms
Mohamed Omar Habeeb "Dheere", governor of Middle Shabelle	Approximately 500 assault rifles and a large quantity of ammunition **03.2006**	Sold the arms to BAM. As a result, prices went down

[a] Dhuunshilke: 1-barrel Zu-23 mounted on a tripod.
[b] Sekawe (also known as SKU): 1-barrel Zu-23 with seat for the gunner.

Annex II

Government of Djibouti response to the Monitoring Group

Permanent Mission of the Republic of Djibouti to the United Nations

21 March 2006

With reference to your letter S/AC.29/2006/MG/OC.16 of 9 March concerning a delivery of uniforms to the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia, I have the honour to confirm that, in December, at the request of the Somali Government, the Republic of Djibouti sent a batch of 2,000 uniforms in connection with efforts to re-establish the Somali police force.

In that regard, Djibouti wishes to reaffirm its full compliance with the provisions of Security Council resolution 751 (1992). Since Somalia lacks a central Government, we have consistently called for full compliance with the embargo on arms bound for that country, with a view to restoring stability and preventing bloodshed.

However, since the Arta and Nairobi conferences, the States members of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, which were responsible for initiating the peace processes, have continued to urge the international community to support the newly formed Government in order to restore order and achieve sustainable peace.

Accordingly, at the request of the Transitional Government, Djibouti sent the uniforms in question, which are non-lethal items and therefore cannot be used to undermine the ultimate objective of achieving peace.

On the contrary, the uniforms will enable the fledgling Government, which we recognize, to differentiate between the police forces responsible for maintaining public order and the other forces, which are in possession of more sophisticated weapons and equipment.

Djibouti stands ready to assist the people of Somalia in their search for peace through the peaceful means of dialogue and negotiation. It also reaffirms its commitment to compliance with the relevant Security Council resolutions and its willingness to cooperate with you in order to achieve their implementation.

(*Signed*) Roble **Olhaye**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

Annex III

Government of Eritrea response to the Monitoring Group

Permanent Mission of Eritrea to the United Nations

I received your letter of 23 March 2006 (S/AC.29/2006/MG/OC.18) addressed to me in your capacity as Coordinator of the Monitoring Group established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1630 (2005) concerning Somalia.

I find the information contained in your letter outrageous and regrettable, for it suggests possible arms supply from Eritrea to "militant fundamentalists in Somalia". This baseless and unfounded accusation against my Government, which has a good track record on combating terrorism in the Horn of Africa, is unacceptable, and there is nothing to be gained from this campaign of smear concocted by whoever is trying to maliciously implicate Eritrea with having links with fundamentalist groups in the subregion.

Eritrea will not be distracted nor will it be discouraged by the false allegations noted in your letter from pursuing its policies and actions of fighting terrorism in whatever form or manifestation it comes. And any future unsubstantiated allegations against Eritrea will be bound to discredit the work of the Monitoring Group.

(*Signed*) Araya **Desta**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

Annex IV

Government of Italy response to the Monitoring Group

Permanent Mission of Italy to the United Nations

6 March 2006

I am responding to your letter of 22 February concerning two alleged supplies of military materiel (dual-use items) by the Government of Italy to the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia.

First of all, I would like to recall that rumours of Italian military non-lethal assistance to the TFG already circulated last October. The spokesman of the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs provided the following official reply to these rumours on 20 October: "Also in light of our broad and transparent commitment in support of Somalia, I categorically deny the allegations made by articles that have recently appeared in the Somali press, fed by insistent rumours, that indicate Italy as a supplier of military vehicles and equipment to the Transitional Government. These allegations are totally unfounded. The Italian Government does not supply nor has it ever supplied, directly or indirectly, any military support to the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia nor to other groups. The sole objective of our action is to alleviate the hardship of the inhabitants of Somalia, and to give concrete testimony to the true hope of the Italian Government, namely, that the Somali people can know peace and stability as quickly as possible."

I wish to provide the following additional information on the two allegations mentioned in your letter:

(a) In accordance with Italian law n. 185 of 7 July 1990 ("control regime of export, import and transit of military materiel"), any exportation of military materiel, including dual-use equipment, must be approved in advance by the competent Unit for the Authorization of Military Materiel. The records of this Unit do not contain any authorization to export military materiel to Somalia, nor any instructions or measures that would allow the legal exportation of military materiel from Italy to Somalia. The same law dictates that the finalization of agreements contracted between private parties, if related to military materiel, must also be authorized by the Unit. The Unit's files contain no evidence that any such contracts between private parties were authorized for Somalia. We can thus exclude in the most absolute terms any conjecture of a link between the Italian Government and the shipment that supposedly took place between 12 and 16 October. The Italian armed forces origin, if indeed confirmed, of the vehicles that in fact seam to have arrived in El Ma'an in that general time frame (as our own sources have also verified) could only be explained by their having been purchased on the market, from stocks of materials deacquisitioned by our armed forces, and indirectly shipped to Somalia by a third party;

(b) During the second half of 2005, the Italian Cooperation financed six flights from the United Nations Humanitarian Response Depot (UNHRD) depot in Brindisi to Nairobi and then on to Jowhar carrying humanitarian goods (electric generators, multi-use tents, kitchen utensils, water containers and pre-fab units). These goods had been procured by UNHRD according to United Nations procedures.

I trust that this information will be useful to the Monitoring Group, whose difficult role in investigating the serious and increasing flow of weapons to Somalia in violation of the arms embargo deserves our full support.

(*Signed*) Ambassador Aldo **Mantovani**
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

Annex V

Government of Saudi Arabia response to the Monitoring Group

Permanent Mission of Saudi Arabia to the United Nations

In reference to your letter dated 23 February 2006 concerning assistance provided by the Kingdom to the Government of Somalia, I wish to inform you that the assistance in question consisted of medical equipment, medicines and anti-gas protective clothing. They were delivered to the Ministry of the Interior of the Government of Somalia as a gift from the Kingdom to assist the Ministry in performing its duties, in particular with regard to medical prevention. They were not intended for any other party or group in Somalia.

Inasmuch as it was not possible to ship them by air, owing to Somali airport conditions, they were shipped via the port of El Ma'an in Somalia.

(*Signed*) Abdulaziz bin Mohammed **Al-Badi**
Second Secretary

Annex VI

Financial tables

A. Summary of revenues from airports

Airport	*Owner/beneficiaries*	*Daily revenue*	*Monthly revenue*	*Yearly revenue*
		(United States dollars)		
Daynile	Mohamed Qanyare Afrah, Osman Atto, Omar Finish, Ifka Halane sharia court	4 275	128 250	**1 539 000**
K-50	Ahmed Duale Gelle (Heef)	3 935	122 850	**1 474 200**
Baledogle	Eyr sub-clan/Habergedir	440	26 600	**319 200**
Kismaayo	Barre Hirale/Juba Valley Alliance	1 006.4	30 192	**362 304**

B. Breakdown of revenues from airports

Daynile airport
Owner: Mohamed Qanyare Afrah

Description	*Daily quantity*	*Unit fee*	*Daily*	*Monthly*	*Yearly*
		(United States dollars)			
Landing fee for aeroplanes carrying khat	3 flights	200	600	18 000	216 000
Landing fee for other aeroplanes	3 flights	300	900	27 000	324 000
Taxes on khat	3 flights/3 138 bags (50 kg)=414 bags	5	2 070	62 100	745 200
Immigration fee (arrival)	4 passengers	20	80	2 400	28 800
Immigration fee (departure)	18 passengers	15	270	8 100	97 200
Taxes (cargo bags/cartons)	35	5	175	5 250	63 000
Buses (khat and public transportation)	60	3	180	5 400	64 800
Total			**4 275**	**128 250**	**1 539 000**

It appears that after October 2005, the frequency of flights transporting khat to Daynile airport decreased from 10 to 3 per day.

Other beneficiaries of revenues collected at the airport:

1. Muse Sudi Yalahow, $15,000 per month
2. Osman Ali "Atto", $12,000 per month
3. Omar Finish, $6,000 per month
4. Ifka Halane sharia court, $3,000 per month

K-50 airport
Owner: Ahmed Duale Gelle (Heef)

Description	*Quantity*	*Unit fee*	*Daily*	*Monthly*	*Yearly*
		(United States dollars)			
Landing fee	16 flights per month	300		4 800	57 600
Landing fee for other aeroplanes	1 flight per day	200	200	6 000	72 000
Landing fee for aeroplanes carrying khat	2 flights per day	200	400	12 000	144 000
Landing fee for other aeroplanes	3 flights per day	300	900	27 000	324 000
Taxes on khat	2 flights x 130 bags (50 kg) = 260 per day	5	1 300	39 000	468 000
Immigration fee (departure)	100 passengers x 16 flights = 1,600 per month	20	1 060	31 800	381 600
Buses (khat and public transportation)	30 (vehicles) per day	2.5	75	2 250	27 000
Total			**3 935**	**122 850**	**1 474 200**

Baledogle airport
Owner: Eyr sub-clan/Habergedir

Description	*Monthly quantity*	*Unit fee*	*Monthly*	*Yearly*
		(United States dollars)		
Aeroplane landing fee	9 flights	200	1 800	21 600
Immigration fee (departure)	80 passengers x 9 flights = 720 passengers (average)	20	14 400	172 800
Landing fee for other aeroplanes	4 flights	200	800	9 600
Immigration fee (departure)	120 passengers x 4 flights = 480 passengers	20	9 600	115 200
Cargo (lobsters, fish, goat meat and fruits)	Not available	Not available	Not available	
Total		**440**	**26 600**	**319 200**

C. Summary of revenues from checkpoints and private business

Checkpoint or private business	*Beneficiary*	*Daily revenue*	*Monthly revenue*	*Yearly revenue*
		(United States dollars)		
Checkpoint at Madina or Wadajir (district of Mogadishu); private business in Madina; Darmoole (road between Mogadishu and Balad); Balad (town 30 km north of Mogadishu); private business in Balad	Muse Sudi Yalahow	7 035	211 050	**2 532 600**
Checkpoint at Afgooye (town 30 km west of Mogadishu)	Osman Hassan Ali (Atto)	11 974	359 220	**4 310 640**
Checkpoint at Bakahaara (area of Mogadishu)	Mohamed Qanyare	1 681	50 430	**605 160**
Checkpoint at Sinai (crossroad in Mogadishu)	Waceysle sub-clan of Abgal	911	30 330	**363 960**

D. Breakdown of revenues from checkpoints and levies on private business

Checkpoint at Madina
Owner: Muse Sudi Yalahow

Description	*Daily quantity*	*Unit fee*	*Daily*	*Monthly*	*Yearly*
			(United States dollars)		
Minibuses (public transport)	55	13	715	21 450	257 400
Lorries	7	27	189	5 670	68 040
Charcoal (per load)	5	18	90	2 700	32 400
Taxis	42	2	84	2 520	30 240
Donkey carts	20	4	80	2 400	28 800
Total			**1 158**	**34 740**	**416 880**

Tax revenues from private businesses in Madina
Beneficiary: Muse Sudi Yalahow

Description	*Daily quantity*	*Unit fee*	*Daily*	*Monthly*	*Yearly*
			(United States dollars)		
Warehouses	70	1	70	2 100	25 200
Shops	1 130	0.3	339	10 170	122 040
Kiosks	1 400	0.1	140	4 200	50 400
Tea sellers	3 000	0.06	180	5 400	64 800
Money remittance business	23	1	23	690	8 280
Telecommunication business	40	0.5	20	600	7 200
Telecommunication business	3	10	30	900	10 800
Total			**802**	**24 060**	**288 720**

Checkpoint revenues from Darmoole
Owner: Muse Sudi Yalahow

Description	*Daily quantity*	*Unit fee*	*Daily*	*Monthly*	*Yearly*
			(United States dollars)		
Minibuses	25	3	75	2 250	27 000
Travellers to all regions	30	25	750	22 500	270 000
Lorries	20	67	1 340	40 200	482 400
Others	55	2	110	3 300	39 600
Total			**2 275**	**68 250**	**819 000**

Checkpoint revenues from Balad
Owner: Muse Sudi Yalahow

Description	*Daily quantity*	*Unit fee*	*Daily*	*Monthly*	*Yearly*
			(United States dollars)		
Minibuses to Balad	14	4	56	1 680	20 160
Minibuses in transit	11	16	176	5 280	63 360
Lorries	20	80	1 600	48 000	576 000
Travellers to all regions	30	27	810	24 300	291 600
Total			**2 642**	**79 260**	**951 120**

Tax revenues from private businesses in Balad
Beneficiary: Muse Sudi Yalahow

Description	*Daily quantity*	*Unit fee*	*Daily*	*Monthly*	*Yearly*
		(United States dollars)			
Warehouses	24	0.33	8	240	2 880
Shops	240	0.15	36	1 080	12 960
Kiosks	466	0.1	47	1 410	16 920
Tea sellers	700	0.05	35	1 050	12 600
Money remittance business	14	0.5	7	210	2 520
Telecommunication business	20	0.5	10	300	3 600
Telecommunication business	3	5	15	450	5 400
Total			**158**	**4 740**	**56 880**

Checkpoint: Sinai crossroad (Mogadishu)
Owner: Waceysle sub-clan of Abgal
Cash collectors: Sinai sharia court

Description	*Daily quantity*	*Unit fee*	*Daily*	*Monthly*	*Yearly*
		(United States dollars)			
Buses km 4 — Sinai	85	4	340	10 200	122 400
Minibuses (Sanaa — Bakaro)	45	2	90	2 700	32 400
Minibuses (Karan — Sinai)	30	2	60	1 800	21 600
Sand and stone lorries	10	3.5	35	1 050	12 600
Pickups	12	8	96	2 880	34 560
Lorries	15	26	290	11 700	140 400
Total			**911**	**30 330**	**363 960**

Annex VII

Countries visited and representatives of Governments, organizations and private entities interviewed

Kenya

Government officials

Kenya Ministry of Defence (Navy)

State representatives

Ambassador of Belgium

Ambassador of the United Republic of Tanzania

Embassy of South Africa

Embassy of the United States of America

High Commission of Canada

International organizations

European Union, delegation of the European Commission

FAO Somalia

Food Security Assessment Unit

ICAO

IMO

Special Representative of the Secretary-General François Lounseny Fall (United Nations Political Office for Somalia)

UNDP Somalia

United Nations Department of Safety and Security

UN-Habitat Somalia

WFP Somalia

Other

Mombasa seminar on piracy and armed robbery against ships in the waters off Somalia, 23-24 January 2006

Oman

Subregional seminar on maritime security, piracy and armed robbery against ships, Muscat, 14-18 January 2006

United States of America

State representatives

Permanent Mission of China to the United Nations

Permanent Mission of France to the United Nations

Permanent Mission of Slovakia to the United Nations

Permanent Representative of Somalia to the United Nations

Permanent Mission of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations

Permanent Mission of Qatar to the United Nations

Permanent Representative of Yemen to the United Nations

United States Mission to the United Nations

International organizations

Al-Qaida/Taliban Monitoring Team (United Nations)

Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo (United Nations)

Yemen

Government officials

Vice-Prime Minister and Minister of Interior

Minister of Transport

Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs

Assistant Deputy for Customs Enforcement

Head of the Yemen Coast Guard Authority

Head of the Maritime Affairs Authority

Head of the Port of Aden Authority

Central Bank of Yemen

Ministry of Finance

International organizations

UNDP

Other

Federation of Yemen Chambers of Commerce and Industry